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Defense Counsel as a Witness for the
Prosecution: Curbing the Practice of
Issuing Grand Jury Subpoenas to
Counsel for Targets of
Investigations
By ELLEN R. PEIRCE*
and LEONARD J. COLAMARINO**
The fifth' and sixth2 amendments to the United States Constitution
underscore the importance of the lawyer's role in the administration of
justice. In interpreting these amendments, the United States Supreme
Court has repeatedly recognized that "the right to the aid of counsel is of
[a] fundamental character."'3 The common law attorney-client priv-
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, School of Business Administration, University
of North Carolina. B.A., 1971, Bryn Mawr College; J.D., 1976, Duke University.
** Partner in the law firm of Sohns & Colamarino, New York City. B.A., 1973, State
University of New York at Buffalo; J.D., 1976, University of Pennsylvania.
1. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person.. . shall be compelled in any crimi-
nal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONSr. amend. V.
2. The sixth amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932). The Court has further stated that the
assistance of counsel "is one of the safeguards of the Sixth Amendment deemed necessary to
insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty. . . . The Sixth Amendment stands as a
constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not
'still be done.'" Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (footnote omitted)); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-
73 (1966) (accused must be informed that he has the right to consult a lawyer and to have the
lawyer present during interrogation); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (in-
criminating statements made by suspect who has requested and been denied the opportunity to
consult with his lawyer cannot be used against him in a criminal trial); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel extends to indigent defendants in
state courts through the fourteenth amendment); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 512-13
(1962) ("[T]he assistance of counsel, unless intelligently and understandingly waived ... [is]
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ilege, 4 which shields from disclosure confidential advisory communica-
tions between a lawyer and his client,5 further establishes the importance
of protecting this relationship. Accordingly, intrusions into the attorney-
client relationship should be examined carefully to ensure that the rela-
tionship retains the protection it deserves.
6
A serious intrusion into this relationship occurs when an attorney is
subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury that is investigating his client.
Because the grand jury's mandate is "to inquire into the existence of pos-
sible criminal conduct and to return only well-founded indictments,"
'7 it
has broad investigative powers limited only by the assertion of a valid
privilege.8 Recently, however, the issue has arisen whether special con-
siderations should apply in the context of a subpoena to an attorney who
represents the target of a grand jury investigation. Conflicting decisions
by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second 9 and Fourth I0
a right guaranteed. . . by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329,
332-34 (1941) (allegation that state officers tricked an uneducated man unaided by counsel into
pleading guilty to a serious offense is actionable under the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment); Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (mere formal appointment of coun-
sel, without the opportunity to consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, cannot
satisfy the Constitution's guarantee of assistance of counsel).
4. The attorney-client privilege has been an established part of the common law for 400
years. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS
AT COMMON LAW § 2290 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
5. A frequently cited definition of the attorney-client privilege lists the prerequisites to
asserting the privilege. See infra text accompanying note 114.
6. In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (Walsh), No. 77-GJ-2144, slip op. at 7 (N.D. Ill.
July 24, 1979), rev'd, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
7. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972).
8. Defenses to subpoenas may be of either a constitutional, statutory, or common law
nature. Id. at 688 (citing United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950); Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 438 (1932)). Although the attorney-client privilege is one of the common
law defenses, it is not absolute. Courts have generally stated that when an attorney is subject
to subpoena by a grand jury investigating his client, the decision to allow the privilege must be
made on a case by case basis. The rationale for not adopting an absolute rule in such cases is
that the court should balance society's interest in full disclosure in grand jury investigations
against the policies underlying the attorney-client privilege. In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 671 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the various defenses to a
grand jury subpoena, see infra notes 57-73 & accompanying text.
9. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985).
10. In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1982), vacated
& withdrawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc). The Fourth Circuit, in an unusual turn
of events, decided to vacate and withdraw its opinion when it was advised that Harvey had
been indicted and turned fugitive from justice. Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, a majority of the circuit judges in regular active service may order a rehearing en
banc. FED. R. App. P. 35(a); see 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982). Although such action technically
eliminates the precedential value of the panel decision, its importance cannot be diminished.
Not only is this opinion the flagship for the argument that a court must exercise its supervisory
power to require the government to make a preliminary showing of relevance and need before
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Circuits, on one side, and the Seventh Circuit, on the other, disclose a
controversy concerning whether an ongoing attorney-client relation-
ship 12 limits a prosecutor's power to issue a grand jury subpoena to an
attorney whose client is the subject of the grand jury's investigation.
In the earliest of the three decisions, In re Walsh,13 the Seventh Cir-
cuit reversed a decision by the Chief Judge of the Northern District of
Illinois,14 which had required the government to make a preliminary
showing of need 15 prior to issuing a subpoena requiring an attorney to
furnish evidence about his target client. 16 The Seventh Circuit specifically
rejected the position taken by the district court below, and later by the
Second 17 and Fourth 18 Circuits, that the attorney-client relationship re-
issuing a subpoena to the attorney of a grand jury target investigation, the decision just re-
cently has been relied upon by the Second Circuit. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 759
F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985), in which the court stated:
We find the rationale of the court of appeals in Harvey persuasive. . . . Thus, we
hold that when a subpoena is issued to an attorney to testify before a grand jury
investigating his client whom he has theretofore represented, and where the attorney
will be disqualified if he testifies, the Government should make a preliminary show-
ing of relevance and reasonable need.
Id. at 975 (citations omitted). Thus, the importance of the Fourth Circuit opinion has been
revived by the Second Circuit. The position of the Fourth Circuit on this issue, however,
appears to be in limbo. Although a subsequent unpublished Fourth Circuit opinion adopted
the dissent in Harvey and emphasized the collapse of the Harvey majority's precedential value,
the case was not on point. See United States v. Morchower, No. 83-1816 (4th Cir. Sept. 28,
1983) (concerned the production of documents only, not the compelled testimony of counsel or
counsel's disqualification). Not surprisingly, the opinion in Morchower was written by Judge
Murnaghan, the dissenting judge in Harvey. Because of the extreme importance of the Harvey
decision to counsel representing targets of grand jury investigations, this Article discusses the
principles propounded in Harvey regardless of its precedential value in the Fourth Circuit.
11. In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
12. Although the attorney-client privilege only protects "those disclosures-necessary to
obtain informed legal advice-which might not have been made absent the privilege," Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976), the proper focus of protection, as argued in Harvey, is
the existence of an ongoing attorney-client relationship. Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1009-10.
13. 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
14. In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (Walsh), No. 77-GJ-2144 (N.D. Ill. July 24,
1979), rev'd, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
15. Traditionally, no preliminary showing is required to subpoena parties to testify in
grand jury proceedings. Grand jury subpoenas are presumed to be regular, and the subpoe-
naed party therefore has the burden of showing either the existence of a privilege or abuse by
the grand jury. Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir. 1972). For situations in
which courts require the government to make a preliminary showing, see infra notes 57-72 &
accompanying text.
16. See infra text accompanying note 242 (district court ruling on what the government
must show once an attorney-client relationship has been established).
17. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985).
18. In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir.), vacated &
withdrawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane).
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quired prosecutors to show prior justification' 9 before summoning an at-
torney to appear before a grand jury seeking to obtain information about
a client.
In In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey),20 the Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court's denial of a motion to quash a grand jury
subpoena directed to an attorney representing the target of the grand jury
investigation. Pursuant to its supervisory power,21 the court imposed a
requirement that federal prosecutors within the Fourth Circuit make a
preliminary showing of relevance and need before being allowed to com-
pel attorneys to give evidence to grand juries about clients under
investigation. 2
2
Although the Fourth Circuit decision was subsequently vacated and
withdrawn when the target was indicted and then became a fugitive,23
the Second Circuit recently followed the Harvey standard in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena (Doe).24 In Doe, the grand jury issued a subpoena to
counsel for the grand jury target to ascertain whether the target had paid
for the legal representation of certain crime figures who were appre-
hended while engaged in the commission of a crime. The Second Circuit
vacated the district court's order, which had enforced the subpoena on
the basis that the government had made a showing of relevance. The
Second Circuit, finding the Harvey rationale "persuasive," 25 held that the
government must show both relevance and reasonable need before such a
subpoena would be issued.
A number of federal courts have characterized the practice of sub-
poenaing an attorney to appear before and furnish evidence to the same
grand jury that is investigating his client as "disturbing" and "danger-
ous."' 26 In particular, this practice is of growing concern to corporate
clients, who are increasingly relying on lawyers as business transactions
19. Walsh, 623 F.2d 489.
20. 676 F.2d 1005, 1012 (4th Cir.), vacated & withdrawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982)
(en banc).
21. It is well-settled that federal courts have supervisory power over grand juries and
may, in certain instances, request a preliminary showing from the government prior to the
issuance of a subpoena. Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1012; In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield),
486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973).
22. Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1012.
23. In re Special Grand Jury 81-1 (Harvey), 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
24. 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985); see also supra notes 246-64 & accompanying text.
25. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 759 F.2d 968, 975 (2d Cir. 1985).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Wolfson, 558 F.2d 59, 65 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Colacurcio, 499 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1974); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473
F.2d 840, 843 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 945
(E.D. Pa. 1976); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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become more complex and increasingly circumscribed by government
regulations. 27 In addressing the special problems arising out of the prac-
tice of directing grand jury subpoenas to attorneys for targets of grand
jury investigations, this Article will first review the nature and scope of
grand jury subpoenas and the procedures followed in issuing such sub-
poenas.28 Next, the Article examines the unique problems facing the at-
torney and his target client when a grand jury subpoena is directed to the
attorney,29 reviews the traditional defenses that may be raised under such
circumstances, 30 and discusses the court's use of its supervisory power to
require a preliminary showing of relevance for all subpoenas. 31 Finally,
the authors propose a solution that all federal courts should adopt.32 The
Article concludes that, under the special circumstances arising when an
attorney is subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury that is investigating
his client, the attorney-client relationship warrants stronger safeguards
than are currently available. 33 Although that the lawyer under these cir-
cumstances should not have an unqualified right to refuse to appear, the
authors do believe that the nature of the attorney-client relationship and
the problems posed by the practice of subpoenaing the target client's at-
torney require that the government justify the intrusion into that rela-
tionship. Requiring the government to make a preliminary showing, as
in Harvey, strikes the proper balance between the competing goals of pro-
tecting against unwarranted intrusions into the attorney-client relation-
ship and preserving the grand jury's authority to obtain information
pertinent to possible criminal prosecutions. 34
27. Burke, The Duty of Confidentiality and Disclosing Corporate Misconduct, 36 Bus.
LAW. 239, 240 (1981).
28. See infra notes 35-52 & accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 53-56, 88-101 & accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 57-87, 102-75 & accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 176-269 & accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 301-05 & accompanying text.
33. The existing attorney-client privilege and attorney work product exemptions from
disclosure are not sufficient protection under these circumstances because they only become
operative after the lawyer has made an appearance before the grand jury. Furthermore, the
protection afforded is on a question by question or item by item basis and does not afford
general protection to the attorney-client relationship. See infra notes 102-75 & accompanying
text.
34. The concerns raised by juxtaposition of the competing goals of the grand jury, on the
one hand, and the attorney asked to testify concerning his client, on the other hand, are aptly
summarized by Judge Frankel in In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966):
On the one hand, there is the heavy weight of history and public need commanding
that the grand jury's investigations be as unfettered as possible. . . . And the Gov-
ernment comes here with the laudable purpose of guarding against suspected attacks
on the integrity of the judicial process itself. . . . On the other hand, the disclosures
now demanded touch a vital center in the administration of criminal justice, the
July 1985]
Procedure and Practice in Compelling Attorneys to Give
Evidence About Clients to Grand Juries
The grand jury originated in English tradition, where it "served for
centuries both as a body of accusers sworn to discover and present for
trial persons suspected of criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citi-
zens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action."' 35 The grand
jury's importance as a judicial institution in the United States is evi-
denced by its inclusion in the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which
provides that federal prosecution for capital or other serious crimes can
be instituted only by presentment or indictment by a grand jury. 36 In
theory, the grand jury today still serves "the dual function of determin-
ing if there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed
and of protecting citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. '37
Due to the nature of its charge, the grand jury possesses a sweeping
lawyer's work in investigating and preparing the defense of a criminal charge. Ap-
praising these interests in the circumstances now presented, the court concludes that
the attorney was not only entitled, but probably required, to withhold answers to the
grand jury's questions. In explaining this conclusion, it bears emphasis that while the
witness before us is a lawyer, the crucial interests at stake belong to the whole com-
munity. As a seasoned trial lawyer and Justice said, "'it too often is overlooked that
the lawyer and the law office are indispensable parts of our administration of justice
... .The welfare and tone of the legal profession is therefore of prime consequence
to society, which would feel the consequences" of a practice impairing the lawyer's
effective representation of his client ....
And so we start here with a demand that is troublesome on its face-a demand
that a lawyer be forced to testify about his work in supposed defense of a client. Our
problem is not solved, but it is affected, by a recognition that this sort of procedure
must have at least a slightly chilling impact upon counsel for defendants in criminal
cases. Again, this has nothing to do with whether lawyers for their own sakes should
be treated better or worse than other people. It has to do with how the public may
fare ....
Id. at 684-85 (citations omitted).
35. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-43 (1974). For a discussion of the his-
tory and function of the grand jury, see Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-63 (1956);
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-83 (1919); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 301-07 (1884); 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW 151-53 (2d ed. 1898).
36. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
37. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-87 (1972). See also Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375 (1962), in which the court stated:
Historically, [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security to the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the invaluable function
in our society of standing between the accuser and the accused .. .to determine
whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power or
by malice and personal ill will.
Id. at 390 (footnote omitted).
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license in its investigative powers, 38 and generally, no citizen may escape
its mandate.39 The power to subpoena witnesses and documents is criti-
cal to fulfilling its function,4° and the grand jury has no obligation to
explain its reasons for seeking any particular information in connection
with its investigation. 41 Thus, a subpoenaed witness often has no idea
why he has been subpoenaed, nor of the purpose for which his testimony
will be used. Nevertheless, the obligation to testify before the grand jury
is viewed as so fundamental to the administration of justice that a wit-
ness' interest in privacy is subordinated to the public's overriding interest
in complete disclosure.42 The grand jury's powers, however, are not
without some limitations and, as discussed below, witnesses are some-
times protected from its inquisitive eye by constitutional, common law,
or statutory privileges.
43
The grand jury is limited in another respect. Because it must rely on
the court for enforcement of its orders, the grand jury cannot perform its
investigative function without the aid of the judiciary. 44 Thus, even if the
subpoenaed matters are not protected by constitutional, common law, or
statutory privilege, a court may utilize its supervisory power to quash a
grand jury subpoena. 45 Nonetheless, courts generally acknowledge that
38.
It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of
whose inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of
the probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individ-
ual will be found properly subject to an accusation of crime.
Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
39. In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court observed that "[c]itizens gen-
erally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas," id. at 682, and that "the
longstanding principle that the 'public. . . has a right to every man's evidence' is particularly
applicable to grand jury proceedings." Id. at 688 (footnote omitted) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 4, § 2192).
40. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); see also Note, Grand Jury--Attorney-
Client Privilege and Right to Counsel For The Party Under Investigation, 19 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 487 (1983).
41. In re Special Feb. 1975 Grand Jury (Lopez), 565 F.2d 407, 411 (7th Cir. 1977).
42. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919).
43. See infra notes 57-86, 101-74 & accompanying text; see also United States v. Bryan,
339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950) (exemptions recognized when "a substantial individual interest...
outweigh[s] the public interest in the search for truth"); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421, 438 (1932) (statute providing for personal jurisdiction over absent witnesses does not
violate due process); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2192.
44. Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49-50 (1959) (Grand Jury sought aid of district
court to direct petitioner to answer questions when he refused on self-incrimination grounds.),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Harris v. United States, 382 U.S. 162, 167 (1965); see United
States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir.) (one of the court's enforcement powers in
grand jury proceedings is to compel testimony), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
45. Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a court "may
quash or modify [a] subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive." FED. R.
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the grand jury is "clothed with great independence, ' 46 and have limited
their supervisory powers so as not to interfere with the essential functions
of the grand jury. 47 Because the courts only routinely monitor the pro-
ceedings, it is the grand jury alone, deliberating in secret, that determines
the direction of its investigation.4 8 Unrestrained by the technical rules of
procedure and evidence that surround criminal trials, the grand jury may
compel the production of such evidence and testimony as it considers
necessary.
49
In commanding testimony from witnesses, the grand jury may issue
two types of subpoenas, the subpoena ad testificandum and the subpoena
duces tecum. The subpoena ad testificandum compels each person to
whom it is directed to attend and to give testimony. 0 The subpoena du-
ces tecum requires the subpoenaed witness to produce certain documents
and physical evidence.51 The procedure for obtaining both types of sub-
poenas is very simple, and it is a routine matter for federal prosecutors to
subpoena persons and organizations to testify or to produce documents
before grand juries. The prosecutors simply prepare the subpoena, and
the clerk of the district court in which the grand jury is sitting signs it as
a ministerial matter. Although the clerk may be expected to check that
the subpoena form has been prepared correctly, neither the clerk nor
anyone else makes any substantive review of whether it is appropriate to
compel the named person or organization to furnish the testimony or
documents specified in the subpoena.
5 2
CRIM. P. 17(c). Furthermore, courts have recognized this power even in the absence of consti-
tutional, common law, or statutory privilege. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 759
F.2d 968, 971 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Winner, 641 F.2d 825, 833-34 (10th Cir. 1981);
In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 1980).
46. Brown, 359 U.S. at 49.
47. Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1313 (court may not interfere with prosecutor's decision regard-
ing choice of evidence presented to the grand jury); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (U.S. Steel),
525 F.2d 151, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1975) (court has no right to stay grand jury proceeding indefi-
nitely pending litigation of a state case); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 238 F.2d
713, 719 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 981 (1957). Contra In re Special Grand Jury
No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009-10 (4th Cir.) (preliminary showing required when
subpoena issued to attorney retained by target of grand jury investigation), vacated & with-
drawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486
F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973) (requiring a preliminary showing of relevance for enforcement of a
subpoena).
48. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
49. Id.
50. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a).
51. Id. Rule 17(c).
52. As to this procedure, one district court has observed:
[A]lthough federal grand juries are called into existence by order of the district court,
. ..they are "basically ... a law enforcement agency." They are for all practical
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The impact of the grand jury's authority over a citizen's right to
privacy is evidenced most visibly when an attorney for a party under
grand jury investigation is subpoenaed and required to testify or to pro-
duce documents damaging to his client.53 Absent decisions such as Har-
vey or Doe, which impose preliminary showing requirements, the simple
procedure described above can be used to obtain information from an
attorney concerning a client just as easily as it can be used to obtain
information from any witness. Indeed, there are expanding incentives for
prosecutors to direct their attention first to attorneys in order to obtain
information about the dealings of target clients. Some courts have sug-
gested that prosecutors see this procedure as a possible way to short-cut
investigations.5 4 This is particularly true in the investigation of certain
business-related transactions with which federal prosecutors are becom-
ing increasingly preoccupied.5 5 Attorneys routinely are involved in a
substantial percentage of business transactions,5 6 many of which involve
sensitive and complex issues as well as substantial amounts of money.
The attorneys involved in these large and complex transactions often
must develop the structure and details from a generalized blueprint pro-
purposes an investigative and prosecutorial arm of the executive branch of govern-
ment. . . . Second, although like all federal court subpoenas grand jury subpoenas
are issued in the name of the district court over the signature of the clerk, they are
issued pro forma and in blank to anyone requesting them. . . . The court exercises
no prior control whatsoever upon their use. Third, although grand jury subpoenas
are occasionally discussed as if they were the instrumentalities of the grand jury, they
are in fact almost universally instrumentalities of the United States Attorney's office
or of some other investigative or prosecutorial department of the executive branch.
Grand jury subpoenas then, when they are brought before the federal courts for en-
forcement, for all practical purposes are exactly analogous to subpoenas issued by a
federal administrative agency on the authority of a statute, without any prior judicial
control.
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 89-90 (3d Cir. 1973) (quoting United
States v. Clearly, 265 F.2d 459, 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 936 (1959)) (citations
omitted).
53. Note, supra note 40, at 487.
54. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Stolar, 397 F. Supp. 520, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(referring to "knee-jerk reaction of subpoenaing an attorney in order to seek information
which perhaps could otherwise have been easily obtained"); cf. United States v. Davis, 636
F.2d 1028, 1032 (5th Cir. 1981) (referring to "what has become a familiar IRS tactic: issuing
summonses [for testimony and documents] to the taxpayer's attorneys and accountants"), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981).
55. See generally Note, White-Collar Crime: Second Annual Survey of Law, 19 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 173 (1981).
56. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392 (1981) ("In light of the vast
and complicated array of regulatory legislation confronting the modern corporation, corpora-
tions, unlike most individuals, 'constantly go to lawyers to find out how to obey the
law'.. . .") (quoting Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus.
LAW. 901, 913 (1969)).
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vided by their clients. Thus, the attorneys understand the transactions as
well as, and perhaps better than, anyone else. In addition, the laypersons
involved may not be responsible for, or even capable of understanding,
all of the mechanics and practical and legal consequences of the transac-
tions. In investigations of such transactions, therefore, it is reasonable
for prosecutors to believe that a convenient and natural starting point is
to subpoena the attorneys involved.
Once a witness has been subpoenaed to testify, he must do so unless
he can successfully interpose one of the several recognized defenses to the
grand jury's mandate.57 These defenses traditionally have been catego-
rized as either constitutional or nonconstitutional. 58 The constitutional
defenses include the fourth amendment protection from unreasonable
search and seizure59 and the fifth amendment privilege against self-in-
crimination. 60 Nonconstitutional defenses include, for example, the ar-
guments that the subpoena is too broad, 61 that it improperly calls for
irrelevant or privileged information, 62 that the grand jury lacks authority
to conduct the investigation at issue,63 that the subpoena has been im-
properly issued for the purpose of gathering evidence for an indictment
already issued, 64 or that the grand jury is not pursuing its investigation in
good faith or is motivated by a desire to harass the witness.
65
Certain relationships also limit the information that a witness can be
compelled to produce. These include, for example, the marital relation-
57. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S
665, 689-90 (1972).
58. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 91 (3d Cir. 1973).
59. See, e.g., Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 73-77 (1906). But for cases holding that the
fourth amendment does not require any preliminary showing for the issuance of a grand jury
subpoena, see United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973).
60. See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). Although earlier Supreme
Court decisions recognized that this privilege applied to grand jury proceedings, more recent
cases stress that "the Fifth Amendment does not confer an absolute right to decline to respond
in a grand jury inquiry; the privilege does not negate the duty to testify but simply conditions
that duty." United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976).
61. Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928).
62. McGarry v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n., 147 F.2d 389, 392 (10th Cir. 1945).
63. See Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n., 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
64. Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir. 1972).
65. See United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 45 (1973) (Marshall J., dissenting); United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 12 (1973). Although these defenses have been described as
nonconstitutional, they do have constitutional overtones. See United States v. Doe, 405 F.2d
436, 438 (2d Cir. 1968) (Judge Friendly stated: "Even though evidence is not within a testimo-
nial privilege, the due process clause protects against the use of excessive means to obtain it.").
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ship,66 the clergyman's privilege,67 executive privilege,68 and the physi-
cian-patient privilege.69 For the purpose of this analysis, however, the
most important of these privileges is that arising out of the attorney-
client relationship, which generates the attorney-client privilege,70 the
work product doctrine, 71 and more recently the rule enunciated in the
Harvey decision. 72 By no means do these limitations constitute blanket
immunity or absolute defenses to the grand jury's subpoena power.
Rather, they represent the efforts of legislatures and courts to adjust
properly the delicate balance between society's interest in the role of the
grand jury and the policies underlying the attorney-client relationship.
73
If a witness succeeds in defending against a grand jury subpoena on
any of the foregoing grounds, the court will either quash the subpoena in
whole or in part, or it will require the government to make a preliminary
showing before enforcing the subpoena.74 Because the party objecting to
the subpoena has the burden of showing some irregularity, 75 however,
successfully interposing one of these defenses is no easy matter. Typi-
cally, the factual information relevant to the enforceability of a grand
jury subpoena is in the hands of the prosecutor.76 Furthermore, the re-
quirement that grand jury proceedings be conducted in secrecy compli-
cates the discovery procedure. 77 In view of this rule, the Third Circuit
requires the government to make a minimal showing that a proper pur-
pose exists before the court will enforce the grand jury subpoena.78 Simi-
66. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 333-34 (1951) (husband not required to testify as
to wife's whereabouts when wife was source of information).
67. In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 435-36 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (clergyman's counselling
of college students concerning the draft held privileged). But cf In re Possible Violations of 18
U.S.C. §§ 371, 641, 1503, 564 F.2d 567, 571 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (minister's privilege is not
absolute).
68. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (Air Force Secretary successfully
raised executive privilege defense to shield military secrets from the grand jury). But cf.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-13 (1974) (president's use of executive privilege
failed when couched in terms of public welfare rather than national security).
69. Although not widely recognized in federal criminal cases, the physician-patient privi-
lege has been established by statute in several states. See Note, supra note 55, at 204 n.296
(citing 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2380).
70. See infra notes 101-32 & accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 133-74.
72. See supra notes 20-22, infra notes 291-99 & accompanying text.
73. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 671 n.2 (5th Cir. 1975).
74. Note, supra note 40, at 491-93.
75. Beverly v. United States, 486 F.2d 732, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1972).
76. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 468 F.2d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1973).
77. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)-
78. Schofield, 486 F.2d at 93.
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larly, the Fourth Circuit in Harvey79 and the Second Circuit in Doe
80
require the government to make a preliminary showing of need when the
grand jury subpoenas the attorney of a party under investigation.
An order to comply with a subpoena, issued upon the denial of a
motion to quash, is not a final order and it is not directly appealable.
81
Generally, a witness may not appeal a denial of a motion to quash a
subpoena without first resisting the subpoena 82 and being found in con-
tempt. 3 There are, however, several exceptions to this rule that provide
for a direct right of appeal when the contempt citation is inappropriate,
when compliance with the subpoena threatens a unique and irremediable
injury, or when intervention and appellate review are necessary to pro-
tect the confidentiality of material under one of the evidentiary privi-
leges.84 Another exception to the rule of non-appealability, known as the
Perlman exception, 85 grants a third-party intervenor claiming a constitu-
tional, statutory, or common law privilege a right to an immediate appeal
when a witness who does not himself hold a privilege is subpoenaed con-
cerning the third party's privileged information. This right is available to
the third-party intervenor because it is not likely that the subpoenaed
witness would be willing to risk a contempt citation to protect the third
party. 86 Because the circuit courts are not in agreement as to the breadth
of the Perlman exception, however, it is not applied uniformly to the
attorney-client relationship.
87
79. 676 F.2d 1005, 1010 (4th Cir.), vacated & withdrawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982)
(en banc).
80. 759 F.2d 968, 975 (2d Cir. 1985).
81. In United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971), Justice Brennan defended this
policy:
[T]he necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal law justifies put-
ting one who seeks to resist the production of desired information to a choice be-
tween compliance with a trial court's order to produce prior to any review of that
order, and resistance to that order with the concomitant possibility of an adjudica-
tion of contempt if his claims are rejected on appeal.
82. Id. at 532; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 328 (1940) (grand jury witness
must either obey the subpoena or challenge its validity in enforcement proceedings).
83. A contempt citation is an immediately appealable final decision and thus provides a
party the route for review of an ordinarily nonappealable interlocutory order. Alexander v.
United States, 201 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1906).
84. See Note, supra note 55, at 205 nn.300-03 & cases cited therein.
85. The exception derives its name from Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918).
86. Id.
87. For cases holding that a client-intervenor, claiming attorney-client privilege, may in-
voke the Perlman exception to appeal an order denying a motion to quash a grand jury sub-
poena issued to his attorney, see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Malone), 655 F.2d 882, 884-85
(8th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199, 201-03 (5th Cir. 1981); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (Katz), 623 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1980); Velsicol Chem. Corp. v.
United States, 616 F.2d 1021, 1025 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC
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Problems Raised by Issuing Grand Jury Subpoenas to Attorneys
for Grand Jury Targets
The issuance of a grand jury subpoena to an attorney for the pur-
pose of obtaining information concerning a client under investigation ad-
versely affects the attorney-client relationship, the attorney and the client
as individuals, and the societal interests promoted by the adversary sys-
tem as a whole. The problems entailed in calling an attorney before a
grand jury to give evidence about a client were aptly summarized in In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis):
The practice permits the government by unilateral action to create the
possibility of a conflict of interest between attorney and client, which
may lead to a suspect's being denied his choice of counsel by disqualifi-
cation. The very presence of the attorney in the grand jury room, even
if only to assert valid privileges, can raise doubts in the client's mind as
to his lawyer's unfettered devotion to the client's interests and thus
impair or at least impinge upon the attorney-client relationship.88
The insertion of a wedge between the attorney and his client in this
manner has broad and troublesome implications. To require an attorney
to give evidence about a client to a grand jury strains "the trust and
confidence which must exist between the client and his lawyer in order to
preserve their relationship."'8 9 The client who previously turned to his
attorney for help suddenly faces the possibility that the attorney's knowl-
edge about his affairs will be turned against him. The client knows that
the attorney's disclosure of information to the grand jury will be of little
benefit to him and may do him serious harm. Thus, to the extent that the
attorney must cooperate with the grand jury, his loyalty to his client is
divided. The client may believe that the trust he vested in his attorney
was misplaced. The lesson of such an experience for the client is to keep
potentially incriminating information out of his attorney's knowledge.90
Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1979). But see In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298, 1301-02
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (client-intervenor, claiming both attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine may not invoke Perlman exception to appeal an order denying motion to quash a
grand jury subpoena issued to his counsel); In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15, 17-18 (1st Cir.)
(client-intervenor may not invoke Perlman exception on basis of attorney-client privilege under
same circumstances), application for stay denied, 444 U.S. 1041 (1980).
88. 412 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (referring to United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 237 (1975)).
89. In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (Walsh), No. 77-GJ-144, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill.
July 24, 1979), rev'd, 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
90. As observed in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976):
As a practical matter, if the client knows that damaging information could more
readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure than from himself in the
absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and it
would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice.
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In addition, the attorney served with a grand jury subpoena faces
the possibility that he will be asked to supply information that may in-
criminate his client. Information that incriminates may take any form;
depending upon what other information the authorities already know,
the most trivial detail may be all that is necessary to decide the question
of whether to prosecute. 9 1 Thus, even unprivileged and apparently innoc-
uous information can help trigger an indictment. This fact has led the
Supreme Court to define expansively the information covered by the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination, and to hold that a party
does not have to disclose information that could help to form a link in a
chain of evidence that could be used against him.
9 2
Nevertheless, it is well-settled that an attorney-witness cannot in-
voke his client's fifth amendment privilege to withhold information. De-
spite several contrary lower court decisions,93 the Supreme Court held in
Fisher v. United States 94 that the personal nature of the privilege against
self-incrimination prohibits an attorney from asserting it on behalf of a
client. Accordingly, an attorney subpoenaed by a grand jury may be re-
quired to disclose information that might lead to evidence that could be
used against his client. This can put an attorney in a most difficult posi-
tion. First, the attorney might feel that he is betraying a client whose
interests he was hired, and is obligated, to advocate. Second, the lawyer
who supplies incriminating evidence about a client may lose that client
because of the appearance of a reversal of the attorney's loyalties. Third,
after the attorney produces incriminating information about his client, he
may be disqualified from representing the client in any prosecution re-
sulting from the grand jury proceeding in which the lawyer
Another case, In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), also noted the problems
created by forcing attorneys to give evidence about their clients to grand juries. The court held
that an attorney did not have to testify about an alleged conversation among himself, his client,
and a prospective grand jury witness, during which the prospective witness supposedly was
persuaded to corroborate the client's previous testimony before the grand jury. Although the
Terkeltoub decision focused on the attorney's work product privilege, id. at 842-43, Judge
Frankel's reasoning had broader implications: "[I]t bears emphasis that while the witness
before us is a lawyer, the crucial interests at stake belong to the whole community." Id. at 684;
see supra note 34.
Terkeltoub and its reasoning have been followed in numerous cases. See, e.g., In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Stur-
gis), 412 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Rosenbaum), 401 F. Supp.
807 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
91. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1975).
92. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
93. E.g., United States v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460, 466-68 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United
States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962); In re House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 97-98 (N.D. Cal. 1956);
see also 8 J.WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2307.
94. 425 U.S. 391, 396-401 (1976).
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participated. 95
An attorney who is served with a grand jury subpoena for informa-
tion about a client is likely to encounter a host of other difficulties as
well. While obtaining instructions from his client concerning his re-
sponse to the subpoena, the attorney will most likely first need to explain
to the client the attorney's obligation to cooperate with law enforcement
authorities. Not surprisingly, the client may have trouble understanding
the lawyer's apparent reversal of loyalty. The client is likely to believe
that he paid for an attorney totally committed to advocating the client's
interests, and might find it difficult to understand why the attorney must
now cooperate with authorities who are threatening those same interests.
If the client instructs the subpoenaed attorney to resist disclosure,
additional difficulties arise. The attorney could then become involved in
litigation that will almost certainly involve issues of privilege,96 in addi-
tion to other grounds97 for challenging the subpoena. In such a situation,
the attorney could well find himself called upon to undertake a course of
action resulting in a contempt citation.
98
Furthermore, whatever the client's instructions, the attorney must
define the extent of his professional obligations. The existing Model
Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
[A] lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the
client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of him-
self or of a third person, unless the client consents after full
disclosure.99
The Rule further permits the lawyer to disclose confidences and secrets
when required by law or court order.l10
95. In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 n.4 (4th Cir.),
vacated & withdrawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc). Pursuant to the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer
learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be called as a witness other
than on behalf of his client, he may continue the representation until it is apparent
that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBrrY DR 5-102(B) (1982) (emphasis added).
Thus, as the Second Circuit noted in In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 759 F.2d 968, 973 (2d
Cir. 1985), "by calling an attorney as a witness against his client, the Government is surely
setting the stage for the attorney's ultimate disqualification."
96. See infra notes 111-74 & accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 57-73 & accompanying text.
98. See supra note 83.
99. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1982).
100. Id. DR 4-101(C)(2). A "confidence" is defined as information within the attorney-
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An attorney served with a grand jury subpoena calling for the pro-
duction of information concerning a client is likely to encounter
problems with regard to disclosure of client's "secrets."10 1 Because such
"secrets" are, by definition, not privileged, the attorney may be com-
pelled to reveal them to a grand jury even though the Disciplinary Rule
prohibits such disclosures. Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(2), however, re-
lieves the dilemma the attorney confronts in this situation by providing
that an attorney does not act improperly in disclosing "confidences" or
"secrets" when such disclosures are required by law or court order.
Under this subsection, the problem facing the attorney is to determine at
what point disclosure of a client's "secrets" is required by law or court
order. Is it enough for the attorney personally to make this decision, or
must he first litigate the arguments against disclosure? If litigation is
required, which of the various arguments against disclosure need be
made and how far must the litigation be pursued? After the lower court
has ordered disclosure, must the lawyer go into contempt to obtain an
appeal prior to disclosure of arguably privileged information? Further, if
the client wants to preserve secrecy to the maximum extent possible, but
is unable to afford the cost of such litigation, does the Disciplinary Rule
require the attorney to commit his own resources to litigate such issues?
Essentially, the lawyer who is asked to produce information that
might incriminate a client is being asked to engage in conduct that is
inconsistent with the role of a totally committed advocate of the client's
interest. In this situation, the lawyer's roles as citizen and officer of the
court, on the one hand, and the client's advocate, on the other hand, are
in direct conflict. This conflict and the attendant strains placed on the
adversary system inevitably result whenever a grand jury subpoenas an
attorney to produce evidence about his client.
Efforts to Resolve the Conflicts
Despite the damaging impact that the mere presence of counsel
before a grand jury investigating his client1 0 2 creates for the attorney-
client privilege and a "secret" is defined as information outside the privilege that "the client
has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would
be likely to be detrimental to the client." Id. DR 4-101(A).
101. Id. DR 4-101(A).
102. See supra notes 87-100 & accompanying text. The harm to the attorney-client rela-
tionship may already have been done at this point. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis),
412 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 (E.D. Pa 1976); accord In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647
(M.D. Fla. 1977). Furthermore, the attorney's response to a question, which itself does not
violate a privilege or invade an exempt area of inquiry, may inescapably lay the groundwork
for such a violation. The courts have held that normally unprivileged information should be
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client relationship, the attorney has no choice under the law but to ap-
pear when summoned. 103 The attorney-client relationship does not affect
the initial obligation to appear because neither the attorney-client nor the
work product privilege arises until the subpoenaed party appears before
the grand jury.1°4 At this point, it is generally agreed that the attorney
should assert privileges on a question by question and document by docu-
ment basis.10 5 Further, the court is entitled to inspect any document in
order to ensure that it is in fact privileged. 10 6 In short, although the
attorney-client and work product privileges help to protect the attorney-
protected when disclosure would only be for purposes of substantiating information the gov-
ernment already possessed. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir.
1975) ("Just as the client's verbal communications are protected, it follows that other informa-
tion, not normally privileged, should also be protected when so much of the substance of the
communication is already in the government's possession that additional disclosures would
yield substantially probative links in an existing chain of inculpatory events or transactions.").
In addition, courts have held that the privilege may be invoked if a strong probability exists
that disclosure would implicate the client in criminal activity for which advice was sought.
United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977). These privilege rules,
however, are applied only on a case by case basis. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517
F.2d 666, 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 631 (9th Cir. 1960).
Beyond this, the government is not required, at the time the subpoena is issued, to reveal
information necessary for the court to determine whether the attorney-client privilege applies.
In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir.), vacated & with-
drawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc). The concerns raised by these limitations to the
attorney-client privilege were aptly summarized by the Fourth Circuit in Harvey:
When a subpoena is issued against an attorney in an on-going attorney-client rela-
tionship, the attorney may well be placed in the position of becoming a witness
against his client or risking contempt. In either case, there is a strong possibility that
a wedge will be driven between the attorney and the client and the relationship will
be destroyed. These important private interests should not be sacrificed to the public
interest furthered by the grand jury's criminal investigation unless some preliminary
showing is made by the government.
Id
103. As one court aptly stated:
We hold, therefore, that an attorney-witness must, except in the most exceptional of
circumstances, honor a properly issued subpoena by appearing before the grand jury.
It is then for the trial court to determine whether a specific interrogatory posed by
the grand jury or the district attorney calls for an answer which falls within or with-
out the privilege; or, whether the information sought to be elicited is so inextricably
intertwined with confidential communications that if untangled, that which is not
within the privilege would be meaningless without that which is privileged. In the
latter event the privilege should also be respected.
Losavio v. District Court, 188 Colo. 127, 135, 533 P.2d 32, 36 (1975).
104. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1039 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 320
(1981); see also Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 449 (1964).
105. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1038 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 320
(1981); see also United States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682, 685 (5th Cir.) ("[a] 'blanket' refusal to
answer is unacceptable"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 826 (1974).
106. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 864 (8th Cir.) (citing Brown v. United
States, 276 U.S. 134, 144 (1928)), cert denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956).
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client relationship, these privileges have definite limitations and provide
insufficient protection in the grand jury arena.
The Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest evidentiary privilege con-
cerning confidential communications known to common law. 10 7 It ap-
plies to corporate clients as well as to individuals, 10 8 and its purpose is to
encourage full disclosure and frank communication between attorneys
and their clients. 109 The Supreme Court has justified this common law
doctrine by stating that "if the client knows that damaging information
could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure
than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluc-
tant to confide in his lawyer and it would be difficult to obtain fully in-
formed legal advice." ' 1 0 Further, without the attorney-client privilege it
would be difficult to maintain a sense of loyalty between the attorney and
his client, II or to comply with the fundamental ethical requirements in-
herent in the fiduciary relationship between the two.
112
Despite the evident respect accorded the attorney-client privilege,
113
it violates the general rule requiring every man's testimony in furtherance
107. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2290.
108. Id.
109. Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389-90 (1981); see also Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) ("The attorney-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate
and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the
professional mission is to be carried out.").
110. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
111. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 87.
112. As Wigmore pointed out:
The sense of treachery in disclosing ... confidences is impalpable and somewhat
speculative, but it is there nevertheless .... [I]t must be repugnant to any honora-
ble man to feel that the confidences which his relation naturally invites are liable at
the opponent's behest to be laid open through his own testimony. He cannot but feel
the disagreeable inconsistency of being at the same time the solicitor and the revealer
of the secrets of the cause. This double-minded attitude would create an unhealthy
moral state in the practitioner.
8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2291 (citations omitted); see also Zwerling, Federal Grand
Juries v. Attorney Independence and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1263, 1281
(1976).
This same sense of moral obligation is echoed in the American Bar Association's Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that "the proper functioning of the legal system" and
the attorney-client judiciary relationship demand the preservation of a client's confidences by
his attorney. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1982); see Zwerling,
supra, at 1281.
113. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4,
§ 87; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2290; Zwerling, supra note 11, at 1280-81.
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of the search for justice.114 Therefore, courts have limited the scope of
the attorney-client privilege and traditionally have ruled that it applies
only if the following conditions are met:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client;
(2) the person to Whom the communication was made (a) is a member
of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer;
(3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was in-
formed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and
(4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client. 115
Certain areas of inquiry are not privileged either because they are
not "communications," or they are not confidential. For example, the
fact that a communication took place between an identified client and his
attorney is not privileged. 1 6 Attorneys generally may be questioned as
to the whereabouts of their client and as to whether they have communi-
cated with them." 7 Furthermore, information involving the receipt of
fees and the identity of the payor is usually not privileged," 8 and grand
juries have been allowed to compel production of documents such as
ledgers, bills, time records, and retainer agreements concerning an attor-
ney's representation of a client. 119 Finally, because a client does not usu-
ally disclose his identity to an attorney in confidence, 120 "the identity of
the attorney's client, or the name of the real party in interest, and the
terms of the employment" are not considered privileged matters. 121 An
114. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682, 688 (1972) ("Citizens generally are not
constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas. . . [and] the public. . . has a right to
every man's evidence.").
115. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950),
cited with approval in United States v. Goldfarb, 328 F.2d 280, 282 (6th Cir. 1964).
116. United States v. Kendrick, 331 F.2d 110 (4th Cir. 1964).
117. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Served Upon Field, 408 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
118. In re Jan. 1976 Grand Jury (Genson), 534 F.2d 719 (7th Cir. 1976) (receipt of fees);
United States v. Haddad, 527 F.2d 537 (6th Cir. 1975) (receipt of fees), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
974 (1976); In re Grand Jury Appearance of Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir.) (identity of
payee), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir.
1974) (receipt of fees).
119. United States v. Cromer, 483 F.2d 99, 101 (9th Cir. 1973).
120. Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951
(1963).
121. Behrens v. Hironimus, 170 F.2d 627, 628 (4th Cir. 1948); see also In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Tinari), 631 F.2d 17, 19 (3d Cir. 1980) (absent unusual circumstances, neither
the identity of clients nor fee arrangements are protected by the attorney-client privilege), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1083 (1981); NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1965) (identity of
client is not generally privileged).
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exception to this rule is sometimes recognized when disclosure of the
identity of a client would implicate the client in the very activity for
which he sought legal advice. Thus, in Baird v. Koerner, 22 in which an
attorney anonymously deposited certain sums of money in the IRS fund
for unidentified collectors, the Ninth Circuit held that the identity of the
clients was protected by the attorney-client privilege.1
2 3
The address of a known client also has been held to be subject to the
attorney-client privilege under certain circumstances. In In re Grand
Jury Subpoena of Stolar, 2 4 an individual who knew he was being sought
by the FBI sought advice of counsel on the matter, and during the course
of the conversation gave the attorney his address. When the attorney
was subpoenaed and asked to give the address, he refused. The district
court, stating that the client had a legitimate basis to expect that the
attorney would not disclose such information, quashed the subpoena. In
response to the argument that its action would unduly hamper lawful
investigations, the court stressed that "other methods of obtaining the
information sought must be found short of converting an attorney into
an unwilling informant."'
125
The attorney-client privilege is inapplicable in two situations. First,
under what is known as the crime-fraud exception, communications
made for the purpose of committing a crime are not privileged.12 6 Once
the government has made a prima facie showing that the communication
was designed to enable or assist a client in the commission of a crime,'
2 7
the attorney may be compelled to disclose the contents of the communi-
cation. 28 Second, the attorney-client privilege is inapplicable if the privi-
122. 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960).
123. Id. at 633. This exception to the general duty to disclose the identity of a client has
been accepted by the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits. See In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 671 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Hodgson, 492
F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974); Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965);
NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1965); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633,
637 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 957 (1963).
124. 397 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
125. Id. at 524.
126. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1982); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena (Doe), 551 F.2d 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d
1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Rosenstein, 474 F.2d 705, 715 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939); United States
v. Loften, 507 F. Supp. 108, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
127. In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Sept. 1975
Grand Jury Term, 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 589 (1939).
128. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 803 (3d Cir. 1979).
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lege has been waived. For purposes of the attorney-client privilege, any
voluntary disclosure by the client to a third party breaches the confiden-
tiality of the attorney-client relationship, and is considered a waiver of
the privilege not only as to the specific communication disclosed, but in
some cases, as to all communications relating to the subject.129 Because
the privilege belongs to the client, the grand jury can compel an attorney
to disclose confidential information if the client has waived the privi-
lege.130 The waiver may be either intentional on the client's part131 or
unwitting,13 2 and it is the duty of the court to determine whether the
privilege has been waived.
133
The Work Product Doctrine
The work product doctrine is similar to the attorney-client privilege
in that it shares a common origin and reflects the same jurisprudential
concern for the special relationship between a lawyer and his client. 134
While the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage free
129. See Weil v. Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25
(9th Cir. 1981); United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 8
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2016 (1970); see also 8 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2327 ("The client's offer of his own or the attorney's testimony as
to a specific communication to the attorney is a waiver as to all other communications to the
attorney on the same matter." (emphasis omitted)). Courts retain discretion not to impose
waiver as to all communications on the same subject matter when the client has simply dis-
closed a communication to a third party, as opposed to making some use of it. See Weil v.
Investment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981). There
is no waiver if the disclosure is not voluntary. Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 573
F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978); see also In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
130. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647, 652 (M.D. Fla. 1977) ("an attorney
can neither invoke nor waive the privilege if his client desires the contrary"); see also In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Jackier), 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (corporate client
waived attorney-client privilege, thus precluding individual officer from raising it), afid, 570
F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Kahn, 251 F. Supp. 702, 709 (S.D.N.Y.), afid, 366
F.2d 259, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 948 (1966); Note, The Federal Grand Jury:
Practice and Procedure, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 1, 70 (1981).
131. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 73 F.R.D. 647, 652 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
132. Typically, this occurs either when counsel or the client discloses matters of a confi-
dential nature to a third party. In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Horowitz), 482 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973).
133. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956).
134. As Wigmore has noted, the attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine
derive from the same common law. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2318. Furthermore, in
England the privilege for confidential attorney-client communications has not been distin-
guished from the discovery of certain documents and prospective witnesses' statements. In-
stead there exists a "legal professional privilege" which encompasses communications passing
between a client and his legal adviser together, in some cases, with communications passing
between these persons and third parties. Id. at n.3 (citing R. CROSS, EVIDENCE 238 (1958)).
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and candid communication between an attorney and his client, the work
product doctrine is aimed at protecting the effectiveness of an attorney's
trial preparations by shielding such material from adversarial scrutiny. 1
35
The rule assures an attorney that, with some exceptions, 136 materials de-
veloped in contemplation of, or in connection with, litigation will remain
free from the inquisitive eye of opposing counsel. 137 While the attorney-
client privilege only protects confidential communications between an at-
torney and his client, the work product doctrine applies to any materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for an attorney. 38 Further-
more, unlike the attorney-client privilege, which belongs to the client
alone, the work product doctrine can be asserted by either the attorney
or the client.
139
In addition, unlike the attorney-client privilege, disclosure to third
persons does not necessarily remove materials from the protection of the
work product doctrine. Although the doctrine can be waived by injudi-
cious disclosure to third persons, such waiver is not as readily found be-
cause the work product doctrine is not limited to communications
classified as confidential. Rather, it applies to all material "obtained or
prepared by an adversary's counsel with an eye toward litigation."' 
4
0
Furthermore, the work product doctrine protects more than the attor-
ney-client relationship because it covers a complex of individual interests
particular to attorneys that their clients may not share.' 4' For example,
the work product doctrine may protect the interests of attorneys in their
own intellectual product. 42 Thus, in certain respects, although its pro-
tections are more qualified, the work product doctrine is broader in scope
than the attorney-client privilege.143 As created in the seminal Supreme
Court decision of Hickman v. Taylor,'" and subsequently extended in
135. Handgards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 926, 929-30 (N.D. Cal.
1976); accord, In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 63 (7th Cir. 1980).
136. See infra notes 162-64 & accompanying text.
137. Handgards, 413 F. Supp. at 930.
138. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979).
139. Id.
140. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. See id. Courts have often recognized that attorney and client interests are not always
co-extensive and, to the extent they do not conflict, attorneys should be entitled to assert a
privilege regardless of whether the client has relinquished it. See In re Special Sept. 1978
Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 63 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.),
604 F.2d 798, 801 n.4 (3d Cir. 1979).
143. U.S. v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 n.ll (1975).
144. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). In Hickman, counsel for the plaintiff sought to discover notes
that defendants' counsel had taken on interviews he conducted with prospective witnesses in
preparation for trial. The Supreme Court denied plaintiff's counsel the right to discover these
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3),145 the work product doctrine
protects from discovery items prepared in anticipation of litigation. In
this regard, it affords absolute protection to the mental impressions, con-
documents without any special showing of need. Id. at 394. The Court distinguished between
work product that merely contained unprivileged facts and that which contained counsel's
mental input. Id. at 392. To the extent that work product contains relevant, nonprivileged
facts, the Hickman doctrine "merely shifts- the standard presumption in favor of discovery and
requires the party seeking discovery to show 'adequate reasons' why the work product should
be subject to discovery." In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) applies Hickman's "adequate reasons" standard
as requiring that the party seeking discovery show "substantial need" and inability to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the information in the protected work product from other sources
"without undue hardship." To the extent that the work product includes opinions, judgments,
and the thought processes of an attorney, however, it reaches a higher level of protection and
opposing counsel (or the government in the case of a grand jury subpoena) must show ex-
traordinary justification to obtain it. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 513; see Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 401 (1981) ("such work product cannot be disclosed simply on a showing
of substantial need and inability to obtain the equivalent without undue hardship"); FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
Justification for the work product doctrine is found in the words of the Hickman Court:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the advance-
ment of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients. In per-
forming his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain
degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their
counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case demands that he assemble information,
sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal
theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That is the
historical and necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our sys-
tem of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests. This
work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence,
briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs and countless other tangible and intangi-
ble ways-aptly though roughly termed by the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case
as the "work product of the lawyer." Were such materials open to opposing counsel
on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten.
An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, un-
fairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and
in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession would be
demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be
poorly served.
329 U.S. at 510-11.
145. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) extends the protection from discovery of-
fered by the work product doctrine to "documents and tangible things. . . prepared in antici-
pation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's
representative (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)" and
provides that such material may be subject to discovery "only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that
he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by
other means." Furthermore, "the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party
concerning the litigation." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3); see also In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793,
808 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
July 1985] DEFENSE COUNSEL AS WITNESS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
clusions, opinions, and legal theories of counsel. 146 Further, the work
product doctrine is not confined to information or materials gathered by
an attorney 47 and, in some cases, it even includes communications not
made to or by a "client" of an attorney.1
48
While it has been firmly established that the work product doctrine
is an evidentiary privilege 49 that applies to grand jury proceedings,
50
the privilege is qualified and is applied unevenly by the circuit courts. As
discussed below, although the courts generally define the immunity in
similar terms,' 5' their approaches vary on several other aspects of the
146. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
147. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977).
148. Id.
149. See infra note 170. Subsequent to the Eighth Circuit's decision in In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973), the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
determine the applicability of the work product doctrine to criminal litigation in United States
v. Nobles, in which the court found it equally relevant:
Although the work-product doctrine most frequently is asserted as a bar to discovery
in civil litigation, its role in assuring the proper functioning of the criminal justice
system is even more vital. The interests of society and the accused in obtaining a fair
and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence demand that adequate
safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of each side of the case.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 237 (1975). In their concurring opinion in Nobles, however Justices
White and Rehnquist took the position that the work product doctrine does not define an
evidentiary privilege. Id. at 242-54 (White, Rehnquist, JJ., concurring). Nonetheless, they spe-
cifically acknowledged the similarity of grand jury proceedings to civil discovery and recog-
nized that a work product claim might properly be upheld there. Id. at 247 n.5; see also In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 1976); In re Grand Jury Inves-
tigation (Delphi Capital Corp.), Misc. No. 75-192 (E.D. Pa. March 11, 1976).
150. See infra notes 165-66 & accompanying text. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide
the "rule with respect to privileges applies at all stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings."
FED. R. EVID. 1101(c). However, the rules (other than the respect to privileges) do not apply
in proceedings before grand juries. Id. Rule 1 101(d)(2). The "rule with respect to privileges"
referred to in Rule 1101(c) is Rule 501, which provides in relevant part: "The privilege of a
witness. . . shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted
by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience." Id. Rule 501. There
is at present virtually universal agreement that the privilege applies to grand jury proceedings.
See, e.g., In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand
Jury Empanelled Oct. 1979 (Hughes), 633 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.),
604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Dec. 19, 1978, 599 F.2d 504
(2d Cir. 1979); In re Sept. 1975 Grand Jury Term (Thompson), 532 F.2d 734 (10th Cir. 1976);
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Nov. 9, 1979, 484 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); United
States v. Bonnell, 483 F. Supp. 1091 (D. Minn. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum (Rice), 483 F. Supp. 1085 (D. Minn. 1979); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 438 F. Supp.
1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa.
1976); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Rosenbaum), 401 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
151. The following construction of the work product immunity is typical of circuit court
application in general:
Work product consists of the tangible and intangible material which reflects an attor-
ney's efforts at investigating and preparing a case, including one's pattern of investi-
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doctrine: the definition and application of the "substantial need" and
"undue hardship" exception, the definition of the "in anticipation of liti-
gation" limitation, and the extent to which a counterpart of the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege should apply in the work
product context. 152
The principal exception to the work product doctrine is that disclo-
sure be ordered if the opposing side can show a substantial need for the
materials and an inability to obtain their equivalent from other sources
without undue hardship.15 3 The courts, however, have not reached a
consensus on what constitutes "sufficient necessity" or "undue hardship"
so as to overcome the attorney's work product privilege.154 As stated by
one district court:
The few courts that have considered this issue with respect to grand
jury matters have not articulated a definitive standard as to "how
much" good cause or necessity is sufficient to overcome the work prod-
uct protection. Instead, the courts have examined a number of factors,
such as the uses to which the subpoenaed material will be put, the
nature of the material requested, the availability of alternative means
of obtaining the information sought, and the extent to which the Gov-
ernment's asserted need for the requested information is sub-
stantiated.155
It is generally agreed, however, that the type of material being sought is a
critical factor in the determination of whether to override the privilege.
Generally, the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theo-
ries of an attorney are afforded greater protection15 6 than mere factual
gation, assembling of information, determination of the relevant facts, preparation of
legal theories, planning of strategy, and recording of mental impressions. The privi-
lege creates a zone of privacy in which an attorney can investigate, prepare and ana-
lyze a case.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933, 935 (6th Cir. 1980).
152. See supra notes 126-28 & accompanying text.
153. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
154. It is clear, however, that if a witness has died or is otherwise unavailable, the courts
may order the production of work product materials. See, eg., In re Grand Jury Investigation,
599 F.2d 1224, 1232 (3d Cir. 1979) (opposing side entitled to memoranda concerning interview
of a witness who subsequently died); In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F.
Supp. 3 81, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (unavailability of a critical witness in grand jury investigation
justified disclosure of interview memorandum).
155. In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Nov. 9, 1979, 484 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
156. Some courts, including the Eighth Circuit, have concluded that no showing of neces-
sity can overcome the protection of work product based on oral statements of witnesses. See,
e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Duffy), 473 F.2d 840, 848 (8th Cir. 1973) (personal recol-
lections, notes, and memoranda concerning conversations with witnesses privilege); In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (Notes of conversa-
tions with witnesses "are so much a product of the lawyer's thinking and so little probative of
the witness' actual words that they are absolutely protected from disclosure."). Other courts,
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work product, such as transcripts of testimony, lists of witnesses, and
other materials prepared by counsel that do not particularly embody his
mental process.
157
The courts also disagree as to the meaning of "in anticipation of
litigation," and have suggested a variety of formulae for defining the nec-
essary nexus between the gathering of material and the prospect of litiga-
tion. Some courts require the existence of a substantial and imminent
probability that litigation will occur' 58 before application of the work
product privilege, while others require that the threat of litigation be
"real and imminent,"' 159 or that the prospect of litigation be "identifi-
able."' 160 Other courts have suggested that each document and the cir-
cumstances surrounding its preparation must be examined to determine
whether it was prepared in anticipation of litigation.1
6'
although declining to adopt an absolute rule, nonetheless have recognized that such material
should receive special protection. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224,
1231 (3d Cir. 1979) ("special considerations. . . must shape any ruling on the discoverability
of interview memoranda . . . such documents will be discoverable only in a rare situation").
The Third Circuit has held that absolute immunity should not be afforded opinion work prod-
uct in the form of interview memoranda. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231
(3d Cir. 1979). Although the Seventh Circuit has found a memorandum of an interview with a
witness prepared by an attorney with an eye toward litigation protected by the work product
rule, Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970), affid by an
equally divided Court, 400 U.S. 348 (1971), the protection was not absolute. The court went
on to hold that the immunity would be overcome if a showing of substantial need or undue
hardship was made. Id.; see also In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Nov. 16, 1974, 406 F.
Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (unavailability of direct testimony of a fugitive client was the type
of situation that would overcome work product immunity for a client interview).
157. In general, these items are discoverable upon the government's showing of need. See
In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Nov. 9, 1979, 484 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
158. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Ballenger Corp., 74 F.R.D. 93, 101 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
159. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 948 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
160. Stix Prods., Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfgs., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 334, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
1969).
161. Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 151 (D. Del. 1977); Galambus v.
Consolidated Freightways Corp., 64 F.R.D. 468, 472 (N.D. Ind. 1974). The Third Circuit, in
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1229 (3d Cir. 1979), has adopted the formula-
tion set forth by Professors Wright and Miller, which arguably presents the standard most
consistent with the Hickman formulation of the doctrine:
Prudent parties anticipate litigation, and begin preparation prior to the time suit is
formally commenced. Thus the test should be whether, in light of the nature of the
document and the factual situation in the particular case, the document can fairly be
said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation.
8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 128, § 2024. The Fifth Circuit has phrased the test in
the following terms: "litigation need not be imminent ... as long as the primary motivating
purpose behind the creation of the document was to aid in possible future litigation." United
States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1040 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 (1981). The Tenth
Circuit severely limits application of the immunity to "materials assembled ... in preparation
for impending litigation." In re Sept. 1975 Grand Jury Term (Thompson), 532 F.2d 734, 738
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Virtually every circuit that has considered the question has decided
or assumed that the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege
also applies to the work product doctrine.1 62 A majority of the decisions
addressing the crime-fraud exception in the context of the work product
immunity have dealt with the use of an unsuspecting attorney by a client
to fraudulently or criminally subvert the judicial process. 163 The excep-
tion has also been applied to circumstances in which the lawyer has
knowingly engaged in fraudulent practices.' 64
Because the work product doctrine developed in the context of civil
litigation, questions arose regarding its applicability to grand jury pro-
ceedings. Initially, the work product doctrine was thought to be inappli-
cable to such proceedings,1 65 but it is now apparent that this view was
incorrect. 166 In the 1966 case of In re Terkeltoub,167 the work product
doctrine was first held applicable to grand jury proceedings. 168 Although
the court in Terkeltoub cited Hickman169 in discussing the rationale for
holding that an attorney should not be compelled to testify before a
grand jury concerning work performed in defense of a client, the decision
(10th Cir. 1976) (quoting Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 693 (10th Cir. 1968)). The Seventh
Circuit specifically rejects this interpretation. See In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640
F.2d 49, 61-62 (7th Cir. 1980). The Sixth Circuit, which has had opportunity to consider the
issue, has not reached a determination. In re Grand Jury Subpoena dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622
F.2d 933, 936 (6th Cir. 1980).
162. See, e.g., In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 492 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Special Sept.
1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 62 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC
Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802-03 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Sept. 1975 Grand Jury Term (Thompson),
532 F.2d 734, 737 (10th Cir. 1976).
163. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979); In re
Murphy, 560 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1977).
164. See In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1080 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1000
(1982); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 336 n.19 (8th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
73 F.R.D. 647 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
165. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 866 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956); see also United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967).
166. See supra note 150.
167. 256 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
168. In general, rather than construct a common law criminal work product doctrine,
courts have followed the civil model developed in Hickman and set forth in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). This is perhaps because the Supreme Court in United States v.
Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), indicated that the criminal immunity should be applied consis-
tent with Hickman. The lower courts have followed this lead. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1228 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The work product doctrine, recognized
initially in Hickman v. Taylor. . . applies in criminal, as well as in civil litigation."); In re
Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("In sum, we think
the work product privilege assertable in bar of grand jury inquiry is essentially coextensive
with the work product doctrine applicable to civil discovery . . ").
169. Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. at 684 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 514-15
(1947)).
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was based on constitutional arguments as well. 1
70
In general, courts narrowly construe evidentiary privileges in the
grand jury context because they frustrate the function of the grand
jury.1 71 As one court has stated:
As we observed in the context of the attorney-client privilege in In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Sun Co.) . . . in language equally adaptable
to the work product setting, "because the privilege obstructs the search
for truth and because its benefits are, at best, 'indirect and speculative,'
it must be 'strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consis-
tent with the logic of its principle.' "172
In reviewing the operation of the attorney-client and work product
privileges, it is apparent that these two privileges do not solve the
problems associated with requiring an attorney to supply a grand jury
with potentially incriminating information about his client. First, as has
been noted, those privileges are inadequate because they only become
available after the lawyer appears before the grand jury. Second, the at-
torney-client and work product privileges are limited in scope: not all
information potentially incriminating to a client is confidential or other-
wise protected from disclosure by either privilege. In many cases, it is
difficult for the attorney to determine what information may incriminate
his client because this often depends on what the prosecutor or grand
jury already knows. 173 Third, the attorney-client and work product priv-
170. The court expressed concern that a prosecutor's intrusion into the preparatory efforts
of defense counsel represented violations of the client's rights to due process and to effect
counsel under the fifth and sixth amendments. Id. at 685.
The issue of work product immunity was not raised again in connection with grand jury
proceedings until the Eighth Circuit decided In re Duffy, 473 F.2d 840, 844-45 (8th Cir. 1973).
In discussing the Terkeltoub decision, the court in Duffy found that the common law and not
the Constitution was the basis of the court's decision:
In the instant case, the Government seeks to distinguish Terkeltoub on the grounds
that it was based on Fifth and Sixth Amendment considerations which are not appli-
cable to the facts here presented. It is our belief, however, that the work product
doctrine formed the predominant basis for the Terkeltoub decision.
Id. at 842.
In Duffy, the judge held that an absolute privilege applied to counsel's personal recollec-
tions, summarizing notes and memoranda in connection with interviews of witnesses related to
the defense of his client. Referring to Hickman, the court pointed out that the concurring
opinion made explicit a distinction between an attorney's personal recollections, notes, and
memoranda on the one hand, and statements prepared or signed by the interviewee on the
other: "[T]he latter may be discovered by a showing of good cause while the former may not."
Id. at 848.
171. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802-03 (3d Cir. 1979); In
re Cueto, 554 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1977).
172. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802-03 (3d Cir. 1979)
(citation omitted).
173. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1975).
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ileges are not absolute and materials covered by such privileges may have
to be produced in certain circumstances. This is particularly true of
materials covered by the work product doctrine because they often might
be obtained by a showing of need.174 Finally, application of both the
attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine varies substan-
tially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. To alleviate the current confusion
surrounding the obligations of counsel to testify and to present evidence
before a grand jury investigation of his client, it is necessary to take a
closer look at the court's supervisory powers, 175 which provide a superior
means for protecting the attorney-client relationship.
Use of the Court's Supervisory Power
Because a presumption of regularity attaches to grand jury proceed-
ings and thus to a grand jury subpoena, 176 there are only limited circum-
stances in which a prosecutor will be required to make a preliminary
showing prior to the issuance of a grand jury subpoena. 77 Application
of these limited circumstances turns on the facts of a particular case, 178
and the party objecting to enforcement has the burden of showing
irregularity. 179
Although courts have recognized that a party seeking to show abuse
of the subpoena process may use discovery proceedings,180 Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 6(e)' 81 thwarts those efforts in that it provides for
absolute secrecy of matters occurring before the grand jury. Further-
more, as discussed above,' 82 the attorney-client privilege and the work
product doctrine afford only limited comfort to the client because the
attorney must still appear and may only raise the privileges on a ques-
tion-by-question or document by document basis.1
8 3
174. See supra note 153 & accompanying text.
175. The court's supervisory power to quash or modify a subpoena emanates from Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c). See supra note 45.
176. Beverly v. United States, 468 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir. 1972).
177. See supra notes 57-73 & accompanying text for an enumeration of such privileges.
Because the privileges conflict fundamentally with the charge of the grand jury to hear "every
man's" evidence, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408
U.S. 665, 688 (1972), they traditionally have been narrowly construed. See Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
178. In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir.), vacated
& withdrawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones),
517 F.2d 666, 671 (5th Cir. 1975); Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 631 (9th Cir. 1960).
179. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 92 (3d Cir. 1973).
180. Id.
181. See supra note 77 & accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 100-74 & accompanying text.
183. See United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175, 1177 (10th Cir. 1974).
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The magnitude of the problem engendered by the unbridled author-
ity of the grand jury has not gone unnoticed. 184 One developing line of
cases holds that the grand jury should be required to make a preliminary
showing of relevance for all subpoenas.1 85 While three circuit courts
have adopted such a requirement pursuant to their supervisory power
over grand juries, 186 others specifically have rejected this idea as a stran-
glehold on the purpose of the grand jury. 8 7 This section will review the
recent history of cases dealing with the preliminary showing requirement
and trace its application and justification through the Harvey case 88 to
the attorney-client relationship.
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield),189 the Third Circuit
exercised its supervisory power over grand jury proceedings and imposed
a broad requirement on the government to make a preliminary showing
of the relevance of each item sought before a grand jury subpoena would
be granted. 190 Mrs. Schofield received a subpoena that simply com-
manded her presence to testify. 19 ' Upon appearing as requested, Mrs.
184. See, e.g., Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1009; Schofield, 486 F.2d at 92.
185. See, e.g., Harvey, 676 F.2d 1005, 1011-12 (4th Cir. 1982).
186. The Third Circuit took a definite stand on this issue in In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Schofield), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973). Although the Fourth Circuit in Harvey, 676 F.2d 1005,
took an absolute stand on this issue insofar as requiring a showing of relevance and need if
counsel for a target was to be subpoenaed, Harvey was withdrawn and the decision vacated,
thus leaving the Fourth Circuit position unclear. Although a subsequent unpublished opinion,
United States v. Morchower, No. 83-1816 (4th Cir. Sept. 28, 1983), suggested that the granting
of a rehearing en bane "was a demonstration of the presence of a serious question in the mind
of the Court as a whole as to the correctness of the opinion emanating from a panel majority,"
id. slip op. at 3, the en bane decision itself gave no reason for vacating other than that Harvey
had turned fugitive. Furthermore, Judge Murnaghan's interpretation is not without prejudice
as he was the sole dissenter in Harvey, believing that the grand jury in general should be free to
subpoena without a showing of relevance or need. Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1012 (Murnaghan, J.,
dissenting). The Second Circuit has also adopted the Harvey approach requiring a preliminary
showing of relevance and need before a grand jury may subpoena counsel of a target. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena (Doe), 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit position is not
entirely clear because the decision was written by a Third Circuit Judge sitting by designation,
and Judge Timbers of the Second Circuit registered a strong dissent. As one attorney has
suggested, Doe would be a "perfect case" for an en bane review because of the one to one split
by the Second Circuit Judges. See Lawyer Subpoena Policy Tightened, Nat'l L.J. Apr. 15,
1985, at 3, col. 2 & 36, col. 1.
187. See, e.g., In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 705 (Ist Cir. 1980); Matter of Walsh, 623 F.2d
489, 493 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Mc-
Lean), 565 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hergenroeder), 555
F.2d 686, 686 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Universal Mfg. Co.), 508 F.2d
684 (8th Cir. 1975).
188. Harvey, 676 F.2d 1005.
189. 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973).
190. Id. at 93.
191. Id. at 87.
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Schofield was not asked to testify, but was directed by the United States
Attorney to submit handwriting samples and to allow her fingerprints
and photograph to be taken. 192 When she refused, the United States At-
torney moved the district court to order Mrs. Schofield to comply. The
court granted the order, but once again Mrs. Schofield refused to comply.
Throughout the district court proceedings, Mrs. Schofield argued that
the government should state the purpose and need for its requests before
she should be required to comply with the subpoena. She also argued
that she should be allowed to inspect any documents signed by her that
the government had in its possession. 193 The Third Circuit held in favor
of Mrs. Schofield, and set up three requirements the government must
meet in order to establish an adequate preliminary showing. The govern-
ment must show first, that the item is relevant to the grand jury's investi-
gation, second, that such requests are properly within the grand jury's
jurisdiction, and third, that the items are not sought primarily for an-
other purpose. 194 The Third Circuit justified this judicial intrusion into
the grand jury process by emphasizing that the government had no gen-
eral right to any of the requested items.195 In addition, the court pointed
out that the government already possessed all the information that would
justify obtaining the handwriting samples, fingerprints, and mug shot.1
96
In ruling that the government must make some initial showing
before invoking the district court's enforcement powers, the Third Cir-
cuit was obliged to distinguish two Supreme Court decisions 197 holding
that the fourth amendment requires no such preliminary showing to
compel testimony or the production of voice or handwriting samples. In
one of these cases, United States v. Dionisio,198 the grand jury witness was
advised that he was a potential defendant in a criminal prosecution, and
was asked to read the transcript of a lawfully intercepted wire conversa-
tion into a recording device. Dionisio refused, alleging that such a proce-
dure violated his fourth and fifth amendment rights. The government
had shown that the voice exemplars were "essential and necessary" to
the grand jury investigation, and that "they would be used solely as a
standard of comparison in order to determine whether or not the witness
192. Id.
193. Id. at 87-88.
194. Id. at 93.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1
(1973).
198. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
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is the person whose voice was intercepted." 1 99 The Seventh Circuit in
Dionisio had required a preliminary showing of probable cause in open
court before a grand jury subpoena would be issued for such purposes. 200
Similarly, in United States v. Mara,20 the witness had been subpoe-
naed to furnish handwriting samples to aid a grand jury in establishing
whether he was the author of certain documents. As in Dionisio, the
Seventh Circuit had held that the government must make a preliminary
showing of reasonableness and necessity.202 The Supreme Court reversed
both cases, holding that the fourth amendment does not require a prelim-
inary showing for the issuance of a grand jury subpoena to compel testi-
mony or the production of voice or handwriting exemplars.
20 3
The Third Circuit in Schofield distinguished the Dionisio and Mara
decisions on the basis that neither case involved any nonconstitutional
objection to grand jury subpoena enforcement. 2°4 In his concurring opin-
ion in Schofield, Chief Judge Seitz agreed with the majority that such a
requirement was "almost indispensible if citizens are to be afforded mini-
mum protection against the possible arbitrary exercise of power by a
prosecutor through use of the grand jury machinery. '20 5 He further
agreed that the minimal showing requirement was not incompatible with
the Supreme Court's decisions in Dionisio and Mara. Judge Seitz, how-
ever, limited the majority opinion by stating that once the government's
199. Id. at 3.
200. In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276, 280-81 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410 U.S 1 (1973). The
Seventh Circuit rejected an appeal of the fifth amendment claim but held that the fourth
amendment was violated by the compelling of such voice recordings. The court stated that the
grand jury was "seeking to obtain the voice exemplars of the witnesses by the use of its sub-
poena powers because probable cause did not exist for their arrest or for some other, less
unusual, method of compelling the production of the exemplars." Id. at 280. The court found
that the fourth amendment applied to grand jury process, and that "under the fourth amend-
ment law enforcement officials may not compel the production of physical evidence absent a
showing of the reasonableness of the seizure." Id.
201. 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
202. In re Sept. 1971 Grand Jury (Mara), 454 F.2d 580, 585 (7th Cir. 1971), rev'd, 410
U.S. 19 (1973).
203. The Supreme Court stated:
We have held today in Dionisio, [and hold here in Mara] that a grand jury subpoena
is not a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and, further, that
that Amendment is not violated by a grand jury directive compelling production of
"physical characteristics" that are "constantly exposed to the public. ... Hand-
writing, like speech, is repeatedly shown to the public, and there is no more expecta-
tion of privacy in the physical characteristics of a person's script than there is in the
tone of his voice.
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21 (1973) (citation omitted) (quoting Dionisio, 410 U.S. at
14).
204. Shofield, 486 F.2d at 89.
205. Id. at 94 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
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showing of a proper purpose had been deemed sufficient, it could not
then be made the subject of an adversary hearing by the witness 20 6 be-
cause such a hearing would lead to the type of mini-trial the Supreme
Court had condemned in Dionisio.2 0 7 Thus, the Third Circuit, pursuant
to its supervisory power of the courts, requires the government to make a
preliminary showing of relevance and need for all matters subpoenaed by
a grand jury before a district court will consider enforcement.
Since the Schofield decision in 1973, virtually every circuit court20 8
has had the opportunity to review the application of the court's supervi-
sory power to require a preliminary showing for the issuance of a grand
jury subpoena. A majority of the circuit courts have rejected the Scho-
field ruling on the basis that a preliminary showing infringes on the func-
tioning of the grand jury and causes substantial delays in its
investigations. The Fifth,20 9 Eighth,210 and Ninth21 1 Circuits expressly
rejected the imposition of such a requirement on proceedings within their
jurisdictions, while the Seventh and Tenth Circuits implicitly rejected the
Schofield requirement. 212 Until recently, the Second Circuit also had re-
jected the Schofield requirement.213 Although the First Circuit spoke
with approval of the supervisory rule adopted in Schofield, it declined to
206. Id.
207. The Supreme Court in Dionisio expressed the concern that "[a]ny holding that would
saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its in-
vestigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the
criminal laws." 410 U.S. at 17.
208. The authors found no reported cases on this issue in the Sixth Circuit.
209. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Guerrero), 567 F.2d 281, 283 (5th Cir. 1978) ("This
court has decided it will not impose such a requirement [referencing Schofield] without some
showing of harassment or prosecutorial misuse of the system."); In re Grand Jury Investiga-
tion (McLean), 565 F.2d 318, 320 (5th Cir. 1977) ("We are not prepared to make such the law
in the Fifth [Circuit].").
210. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Universal Mfg. Co.), 508 F.2d 684, 686 n.2 (8th Cir.
1975) (declines to adopt the Schofield ruling).
211. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hergenroeder), 555 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1977) (rejected
Schofield stating, "In this circuit the supervision of the grand jury by the district court is more
narrowly construed."); accord, United States v. Wilson, 614 F.2d 1224, 1227 (9th Cir. 1980).
212. United States v. Santucci, 674 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1109 (1983); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1980); In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179, 185
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 928 (1975).
213. In re Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78, 83 (2d Cir. 1978) ("[T]he Schofield standards do not
constitute the law in this circuit."); see also In re Rosahn, 671 F.2d 690, 695 (2d Cir. 1982); In
re Morgan, 377 F. Supp. 281, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d
895, 899 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 941 (1973). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Doe), 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985), which adopted a modified Schofield requirement similar to
that required by the Fourth Circuit in Harvey, limiting the need for a preliminary showing to
circumstances in which the attorney for a target under investigation is subpoenaed to testify
about his client.
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impose the requirement "at this time. ' 214 Several district courts also
have adopted Schofield's preliminary showing requirement. 21 5
While the majority of the circuit courts have declined to follow the
Third Circuit's exercise of its supervisory power to require a preliminary
showing before enforcement of a subpoena, the Schofield ruling has
found important application to the attorney-client relationship by the
Fourth216 and more recently, the Second21 7 Circuits. Indeed, the Fourth
Circuit's application of Schofield in Harvey218 lays the groundwork for
this Article's proposal that a modified Harvey rule be adopted by the
circuits to alleviate the problems associated with the issuance of a sub-
poena to counsel of a client under investigation.
In Harvey, the Fourth Circuit adopted the Schofield requirement of
a preliminary showing of relevance and need in the limited situation
219
when the subpoenaed attorney is in an ongoing attorney-client relation-
ship with the target under investigation. In response to a subpoena is-
sued to his attorney, Mr. Harvey, the subject of grand jury investigation,
argued that his counsel's appearance before the grand jury would violate
the attorney-client and work product 220 privileges and his sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. 221 Mr. Harvey's attorney had been directed to
appear with records of all money received from and disbursed on behalf
of Mr. Harvey. 222 In accepting Mr. Harvey's argument, the court dis-
214. In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 704-05 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Although we believe that the
procedures mandated by the Third Circuit have much to recommend them, . . . we decline to
impose them on district courts within the circuit at this time."). But see In re Grand Jury
Matters, 751 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirmed the quashing of subpoena issued to an attor-
ney of target when attorney was serving as defense counsel in related, pending state criminal
proceedings).
215. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Mia), 425 F. Supp. 717, 718 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (court
applied Schofield and held that the government, in order to enforce the subpoena, "should
make a preliminary good faith showing" as to the relevance, jurisdictional requirements, and
necessity surrounding its request); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (N.G. Allen &
Assocs., Inc.), 391 F. Supp. 991, 995 (D.R.I. 1975) (preliminary showing necessary when
"moving party cannot, without any knowledge concerning the subject matter of the pertinent
grand jury investigation, possibly establish that the particular subpoenaed documents bear no
relevance to the unknown investigation").
216. In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir.), vacated &
withdrawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
217. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Doe), 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985).
218. 676 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1982).
219. The court in Harvey emphasized that "we do not adopt the Schofield rule that a
preliminary showing must be made for every grand jury subpoena." Id. at 1011.
220. Because the court's holding in Harvey was based on the attorney-client privilege and
a client's sixth amendment interests, the court declined to rule on whether the work product
privilege applied to the case. Id. at 1008 n.2.
221. Id. at 1007.
222. Id.
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cussed in detail the attorney-client privilege and acknowledged that it is
not generally applicable to payment of fees and expenses.2 23 The court
noted, however, that an exception applies "where the person invoking the
privilege can show that a strong probability exists that disclosure of such
information would implicate that client in the very criminal activity for
which legal advice was sought." 224 Nonetheless, the court determined
that it was unable to rule on the privilege issue until it knew the relevance
of requested documents to the grand jury investigation. 225 As the court
stated, "[u]nless the nature of the investigation is disclosed, a court can-
not determine whether disclosure of the documents 'would implicate the
client in the very criminal act for which legal advice is sought.' "226
Although the court acknowledged that a subpoena is presumed to be reg-
ular,227 it felt that an exception automatically arose when the attorney
for the target of an investigation is subpoenaed. The Fourth Circuit thus
elevated the status accorded the attorney-client relationship by holding
that the private interest in confidential attorney-client relationships justi-
fies the slight burden that the preliminary showing requirement imposes
on grand jury investigations.
2 28
In determining what the government should present in its prelimi-
nary showing, the Fourth Circuit turned to the Schofield decision for
guidance. The court adopted Schofield's three-pronged requirement,
22 9
223. Id. at 1009.
224. Id. (quoting United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977)).
225. 676 F.2d at 1009.
226. Id. In Harvey, the government had refused to reveal the information necessary for
the court to decide whether the attorney-client privilege applied to the facts at hand. The
Fourth Circuit further suggested that such a subpoena served on counsel of a target without
revealing information necessary to determine application of the attorney-client privilege also
"implicates Harvey's constitutional rights to counsel of his choice." Id. The Supreme Court,
however, has made it very clear that an unindicted grand jury witness' sixth amendment right
to counsel does not attach at the grand jury stage. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit suggested in Harvey the existence of an implied right to coun-
sel at this stage deriving from the sixth amendment:
Thus, even though the witness does not have the right to have counsel appointed for
him, he has a substantial interest in continuing to receive the assistance of counsel he
has already retained for purposes of the grand jury investigation. The interests in
maintaining a proper attorney-client relationship and protecting the confidences of
that relationship are similar to the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel and fundamental to our adversarial system of justice.
Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1010.
227. Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1009.
228. The court felt that such a requirement would not be an impediment to the effective-
ness of the grand jury "and may well facilitate the investigation by providing the basis for a
district court's early ruling on a witness' assertion of the attorney-client privilege." Id. at
1012.
229. The item sought pursuant to the subpoena must be "relevant to an investigation being
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but felt that an additional showing should be made by the government
because of the risk of harm to the attorney-client relationship:
In balancing the public interest in providing the grand jury with the
information it may need against the private interest of maintaining a
confidential and important professional relationship, it is not enough
that the subpoena be shown to be regular. When a grand jury sub-
poena undermines an ongoing attorney-client relationship, the United
States Attorney should also show by affidavit an important need for
the information sought.
230
The Fourth Circuit justified its decision by referring to its supervisory
powers over federal grand jury proceedings 23 1 and, like the Third Circuit
in Schofield, distinguished the earlier Supreme Court decisions, Dion-
iSio 232 and Mara,233 on the basis that they were constitutional challenges
to enforcement of a subpoena.
2 34
The Harvey decision is commendable in that it properly emphasizes
the importance of the attorney-client relationship and the problems
raised by the subpoena of counsel for a target under investigation. 235
There is no significant reason why a preliminary showing requirement in
these circumstances 236 would hinder a United States Attorney's role in a
grand jury investigation. 237 Indeed, if the United States Attorneys are
properly prepared, they will have no trouble showing that the informa-
tion requested is both relevant and necessary to the investigation.
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit's holding in Harvey, the Seventh
Circuit's decision in In re Walsh238 reached a different result. In Walsh,
the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court and held that the govern-
ment need not make a special showing of relevance or need when the
witness subpoenaed was counsel to a target under investigation by the
grand jury. Attorneys subpoenaed by a grand jury investigating their
clients are to be treated just like any other witness; they may be required
to take the stand without a preliminary showing of any sort and may
conducted by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and ... not sought primarily
for another purpose." Schofield, 486 F.2d at 93.
230. Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1010.
231. Id. at 1012.
232. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
233. United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
234. Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1012.
235. Id. at 1008-09.
236. Indeed, the Schofield rule "has not caused any serious disruption of grand jury pro-
ceedings" in the Third Circuit. Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Sub-
comm. on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1589 (1977).
237. Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1012.
238. 623 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1980).
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only assert the attorney-client privilege on a question by question
basis.2
39
In Walsh, the grand jury subpoenaed an attorney and requested him
to produce records pertaining to his firm's relationship with Mr. Volpe, a
grand jury witness who had disappeared. 24° Mr. Walsh, the attorney for
Mr. Volpe, refused to obey the subpoena and the government moved to
show cause why Walsh should not be held in contempt. Ruling on that
motion, District Court Judge Parsons held that the government must
submit a list of proposed questions for in camera review before the attor-
ney would be required to appear before the grand jury investigating his
client. Judge Parsons stated that the government must establish:
(1) [that] the information and materials demanded by the subpoena are
not within the ambit of the attorney-client privilege or the attorney
work product exemption from disclosure, and (2) that there is a partic-
ularized need for the information or materials sought, that no other
sources for such information are known or available, and that the in-
formation or materials sought are material to the investigation. 241
The government complied and the district court quashed the subpoena,
finding that the "cumulative effect" of the proposed questions violated
the attorney-client privilege.242 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, like vir-
tually all courts confronted with the competing interests of the grand
jury and the attorney-client privilege, applied a balancing test.243 The
Seventh Circuit, however, gave little if any deference to the attorney-
client relationship. 244 Walsh was required to appear and testify and
would have the opportunity to establish the applicability of the privilege
to specific questions challenged only on remand. 245
The Seventh Circuit's approach is unsatisfactory because by the
time the case is heard on remand, the attorney-client relationship will
already have been irreparably damaged. The attorney will have ap-
peared, and the client may see this as a position that is counter to his own
interests. This erosion of trust is particularly destructive when the attor-
ney has been responsible for the client's legal matters for many years.
239. Id. at 493.
240. Id. at 492.
241. In re Special Sept. 1978 Grand Jury (Walsh), No. 77-GJ-2144 slip. op at 10 (N.D. Ill.
July 24, 1979).
242. In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1980).
243. Id. at 492-93.
244. See, eg., id. at 492 ("[T]he [attorney-client] privilege must be upheld only in those
circumstances for which it was created."); id. at 493 ("As it is in derogation of the search for
truth, the privilege must not be lightly created nor expansively construed."); id. ("No privilege,
no matter how central to our system of justice, has been held to excuse the obligation of every
person to appear and give his evidence before the grand jury.").
245. Id. at 495.
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The lack of any protections for the attorney under such circumstances
will most likely terminate the attorney-client relationship because the at-
torney will be disqualified from further representation in the matter after
giving testimony against the client.
246
Yet another circuit court recently reviewed the problems surround-
ing the subpoena of counsel of a target under grand jury investigation.
The Second Circuit, following the Harvey rationale, held in In re Grand
Jury Subpoena (Doe) 247 that "when a subpoena is issued to an attorney
to testify before a grand jury investigating his client whom he has there-
tofore represented, and where the attorney will be disqualified if he testi-
fies, the government should make a preliminary showing of relevance and
reasonable need."' 248 In Doe, the grand jury issued a subpoena duces te-
cum to counsel for the target of their investigation. The grand jury sus-
pected the target of having engaged in illegal activities under the federal
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute,249 and
wanted to determine whether the target had paid for the legal representa-
tion of certain persons who were apprehended during the commission of
certain crimes. Such information, according to the government, would
prove the target's violation of the RICO Act and identify him as a leader
in the criminal activity engaged in by his "enterprises." The subpoena
requested the attorneys appearance and production of his fee records re-
lating to the individuals comprising the target's enterprise. 2 50 The attor-
ney, who had represented the target for some twenty years in various
legal transactions, moved for an order to quash the grand jury subpoena.
He argued that the government had shown neither the relevance of nor
the need for the materials sought, and that compliance with the subpoena
would likely disqualify him from the case l. 2 5  The district court denied
the motion, ruling that the information requested was relevant and that
the value of disclosure far outweighed the possibility of counsel's
disqualification.
On appeal, the Second Circuit, in a split decision, 2 52 held that under
these circumstances the government should be required to make a pre-
246. See supra note 95 & accompanying text.
247. 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985). The Second Circuit in rendering its opinion stated:
"[W]e find the rationale of the court of appeals in Harvey persuasive, and ... there is no
dispositive authority to the contrary in this circuit." Id. at 975.
248. Id.
249. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1982).
250. Doe, 759 F.2d at 970.
251. Id.
252. Judge Rosenn, Senior Judge for the Third Circuit sitting by designation, wrote the
opinion with Judge Cardamone. Judge Timbers wrote a strong dissent. See supra notes 263-65
& accompanying text.
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liminary showing of relevance and reasonable need.253 In reaching its
conclusion, the panel relied on both the fundamental importance of the
attorney-client relationship254 and the implication of constitutional
rights.255 In support of its decision, the Second Circuit expressed con-
cern that the "unbridled use of the subpoena" would allow the govern-
ment to determine whether or not an attorney could continue to
represent his client.256 The court stated that "[s]uch a power of disquali-
fication can undermine and debilitate our legal system by subjecting the
criminal defense bar to the subservience of a governmental agent.
'257
The court further found that requiring a preliminary showing of rele-
vance and need was not unduly burdensome to the government.
2 58
In addressing the target's sixth amendment rights, the court cited
Harvey and its reference to implicated constitutional rights.259 Further,
the court stated that the target, by requesting a preliminary showing, was
trying to preserve his right "to have counsel of his own choosing in the
event he is indicted. If the right is not protected now, once the right does
attach it will already have been rendered meaningless. ' '2 60 The court
found justification for its position in an earlier Second Circuit opinion,
which had stated that "the right to obtain the assistance of counsel at all
crucial stages is essential if both the symbol and reality of a fair trial are
to be preserved. '261 The Second Circuit, while conceding that a trial had
not yet commenced, stated that "a sense of fairness and realism" re-
quired a reasonable attempt to be made in order to preserve the ongoing
attorney-client relationship. 26
2
Despite this position taken by the Second Circuit majority, the cir-
cuit's present position is confounded by the fact that the majority opinion
was written by a Third Circuit judge sitting by designation. A Second
Circuit judge, Judge Timbers, wrote a strongly worded dissent arguing
the absence of any real constitutional basis in the majority's opinion,
263
253. Doe, 759 F.2d at 975. In a footnote, the court emphasized the fact that the attorney's
ultimate disqualification was not speculative but had been conceded by both sides. The court
further emphasized that it was, therefore, not expressing an opinion as to the correct standard
to be applied in the circumstance when the attorney's disqualification was speculative. Id. at
975 n.9.
254. Id. at 972-75.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 975.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 976.
259. Id. at 974 (citing Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1009).
260. Id. at 972-73.
261. Id. at 973 (quoting United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1149 (2d Cir. 1980)).
262. Id.
263. Judge Timbers premised his argument on the basis that the "Sixth Amendment right
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the absence of a statutory or common law privilege protecting the infor-
mation the grand jury sought to obtain,264 and the absence of any "policy
basis" for limiting the grand jury's broad mandate.265
Thus, there is a conflict among the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Cir-
cuits, and within the Second Circuit, not only in the application of the
attorney-client privilege 266 and the work product doctrine, 267 but also in
the application of the court's supervisory power to require a preliminary
showing when counsel for a target is subpoenaed. 26 8 The Second and
Fourth Circuits favor the court's exercise of its supervisory power to re-
quire a preliminary showing of relevance and need prior to requiring
counsel for a target to appear before the grand jury. Both courts empha-
size that this requirement protects the attorney-client relationship, which
would otherwise be strained, if not entirely broken, by counsel's required
appearance as a witness against his own client.
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit failed to address the constitutional
issues and only discussed the scope of the attorney-client privilege. It
stated that the limited protections afforded by the attorney-client privi-
lege work and the product doctrine are all that is required when counsel
is subpoenaed under these circumstances. "[T]o afford attorneys the
right to refuse to appear before grand juries," stated the court, "would be
granting a protection far greater than the parameters of the privilege. 269
Accordingly, under the Seventh Circuit's approach, it is an abuse of the
district court's supervisory power to quash a subpoena on the basis that it
seriously impairs the attorney-client relationship.
Alternative Approaches
The Extent of the Problem
Before proposing a resolution to the issues discussed above, it is im-
to counsel 'attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him.' " Id. at 978-79 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972)
(plurality opinion)).
The majority position, however, is well-founded. The client's constitutional right to coun-
sel of his choosing is forfeited at the grand jury stage when his counsel is subpoenaed to testify
against him. Therefore, it is pointless to require an indictment before attaching the constitu-
tional right to counsel. By then counsel already will have been disqualified.
264. Id. at 981-82. Judge Timbers again pursued a traditional argument that the disclo-
sure of consultation with counsel and the fee information are not privileged under the attor-
ney-client privilege even though they may incriminate a client.
265. 1d. at 982-88.
266. See supra notes 107-33 & accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 134-74 & accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 176-265 & accompanying text.
269. In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1980).
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portant to examine the extent of the problem posed by a grand jury sub-
poena to counsel and to consider a number of alternative solutions. As
discussed earlier, permitting prosecutors, without any limitation, to sub-
poena attorneys of targets of grand jury investigations places a great deal
of strain on the attorney-client relationship. The degree of strain de-
pends in part on the expectations and attitudes that a client brings to his
relationship with the lawyer. If a client does not expect undivided loy-
alty and confidentiality from his attorney and thus is not candid in his
disclosures, he is unlikely to feel distressed or betrayed when his attorney
cooperates with the grand jury. Moreover, the attorney is less likely to be
able to furnish the grand jury with information damaging to his client,
because the client's cynicism may lead him to withhold information.270
Such negative expectations and attitudes on the part of clients hinder the
development of successful attorney-client relationships, 271 and should
not serve as a basis upon which to determine the level of protection the
attorney-client relationship deserves.272 It is more reasonable to assume
the existence of a successful attorney-client relationship when assessing
the amount of strain caused by compelling an attorney to give informa-
tion to a grand jury investigating his client. A client in such a successful
relationship will feel distressed and betrayed by the attorney's coopera-
270. The attorney-client relationship is built on a foundation of trust; the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege is to encourage clients to be completely candid with their counsel so as
to obtain the best possible representation. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403
(1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1975); 8 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 4, §§ 2291, 2306; see also United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347
(9th Cir. 1977), in which the court stated:
In our legal system the client should make full disclosure to the attorney so that the
advice given is sound, so that the attorney can give all appropriate protection to the
client's interest, and so that proper defenses are raised if litigation results. The attor-
ney-client privilege promotes such disclosure by promising that communications re-
vealed for these legitimate purposes will be held in strict confidence. The privilege
encourages persons to seek advice as to future conduct. But so important is full
disclosure that the law recognizes the privilege even if the advice is sought by one
who has already committed a bad act. Thus the attorney-client privilege is central to
the legal system and the adversary process. For these reasons, the privilege may
deserve unique protection in the courts.
Id. at 1355.
271. See supra notes 106-I1 & accompanying text.
272. See Note, The Attorney-Client Relationship in the Corporate Organization, 46 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 803, 807 (1980), which states:
The modern justification for the [attorney-client] privilege is that a client must be
encouraged to reveal all pertinent information to his attorney in order to enable the
latter to perform with greater efficiency and effectiveness. It has been noted that the
bond and sense of loyalty between an attorney and his client would be shattered if the
attorney were forced to reveal confidential information.
See also Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391,403 (1976); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 4, § 87.
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tion with a hostile grand jury, even if the client's interests are not sub-
stantially damaged.
273
This strain upon the attorney-client relationship is likely to increase.
As discussed above, several factors make it tempting for prosecutors to
subpoena the target's attorney during the early stages of an investiga-
tion,274 notably the growing preoccupation of federal prosecutors with
the investigation of possible business-related crimes. 275 Accordingly,
without clear judicial standards, it is safe to predict that the practice of
subpoenaing attorneys of targets of grand jury investigations will become
even more prevalent.
Examination of Alternative Approaches
Privileges
As discussed above,2 7 6 the attorney-client and work product privi-
leges are limited in scope. An attorney may have to disclose substantial
and sensitive information about a client to a grand jury in spite of these
privileges. Moreover, because the attorney must appear before the grand
jury in order to invoke the privileges, the perception of the attorney co-
operating with the government is not eliminated. 277 The disparate inter-
pretation of the breadth of the privileges by the various circuit courts
further complicates reliance on these privileges.278
Constitutional privileges afford even less protection to the attorney-
client relationship in the grand jury setting. The Dionisio and Mara deci-
sions279 establish that the fourth amendment's protection against unrea-
273. The Harvey court has expressed best the danger of requiring the attorney to testify:
[T]here is a strong possibility that a wedge will be driven between the attorney and
the client and the relationship will be destroyed. If the attorney resists the subpoena
and is found in contempt, the punishment for contempt may totally destroy the attor-
ney-client relationship .... If the attorney complies with the subpoena and ap-
pears before the grand jury behind closed doors, a substantial chilling effect on
truthful communications from the client to the attorney thereafter would be likely,
especially if the client is indicted.
Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1009 n.4; see In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th
Cir. 1975) (privilege would be thwarted if clients confided in lawyers at peril of compulsory
disclosure every time government subpoenaed attorneys it believed represented suspected
individuals).
274. See supra notes 55-57 & accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 55-57 & accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 173-74 & accompanying text.
277. As to the damage done to the attorney-client relationship by reason of the attorney's
mere appearance before a grand jury investigating his client, see supra notes 87-100 & accom-
panying text; see also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 945-46 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
278. See supra notes 122-25, 158-74 & accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 198-202 & accompanying text.
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sonable search and seizure does not protect a target or his attorney from
the grand jury subpoena's mandate. Similarly, an attorney cannot assert
a client's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in order to
avoid disclosing information to a grand jury.280 Furthermore, although
the sixth amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to coun-
sel, this right does not attach until after the initiation of the adversarial
process.2 1 A grand jury investigation is not technically part of the ad-
versary process, and thus the sixth amendment right to counsel does not
attach at this stage.
28 2
Exempting Attorneys of Target Clients From the Grand Jury
Subpoena Mandate
The Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes28 3 appears to
foreclose the possibility of exempting attorneys as a class from the obliga-
tion to comply with grand jury subpoenas aimed at acquiring informa-
tion about their clients. In Branzburg, the grand jury's power to compel
evidence was challenged on first amendment grounds. News reporters
claimed that freedom of the press would be chilled by permitting grand
juries to force them to disclose their sources. The Court rejected this
argument, declaring:
[T]he grand jury's authority to subpoena witnesses is not only historic
... but essential to its task. Although the powers of the grand jury
are not unlimited and are subject to the supervision of a judge, the
longstanding principle that "the public. . . has a right to every man's
evidence," except for those persons protected by a constitutional, com-
mon law, or statutory privilege. . . is particularly applicable to grand
jury proceedings. 28
4
There is no reason to think that attorneys, who cannot assert a first
amendment argument, should fare better than did the reporters in
Branzburg in attempting to secure a blanket exemption from giving evi-
dence to a grand jury.
280. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Fisher disallowing attorneys from asserting
their client's fifth amendment rights, several authorities had adopted the contrary position that
attorneys could avoid giving testimony incriminating to their clients on the basis of the client's
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g., United States v. Judson, 322
F.2d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1963); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d Cir. 1962); In re
House, 144 F. Supp. 95, 100 (N.D. Cal. 1956); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 4, § 2307.
281. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972) (right to counsel attaches only once the
adversarial process has begun).
282. Although the Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on this issue, see United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976), the Court has indicated in dicta that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel does not attach at the grand jury stage of the adjudicatory process. See
In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957).
283. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
284. Id at 688.
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Further, as recognized in Branzburg, it is undesirable to exempt en-
tire classes of persons, including attorneys, from every citizen's obliga-
tion to comply with a grand jury's demand for evidence. 285 Although the
institution of the grand jury is an imperfect and arguably obsolete one,
the Constitution provides for it,286 and it is an essential, functioning part
of federal and state criminal law enforcement mechanisms. The grand
jury plays a critical role in the investigation and prosecution of criminal
activity by virtue of its subpoena power and its exclusive authority to
return indictments. Thus, there are strong societal interests in keeping
the grand jury functioning effectively. Attorneys, like other citizens,
might have information needed by grand juries and they should be re-
quired to produce such information in the interest of effective law en-
forcement. Exempting attorneys completely from this requirement would
go too far toward giving attorneys preferential treatment and impairing
the important law enforcement interests served by grand juries.
The Schofield Rule
As discussed above, the Schofield rule287 provides that the govern-
ment may not enforce a grand jury subpoena unless it makes a prelimi-
nary showing by affidavit that the information sought is "relevant to an
investigation being conducted by the grand jury and properly within its
jurisdiction, and is not sought primarily for another purpose. ' 288 The
Schofield rule, however, does not meet the particular concerns of the at-
torney compelled to furnish information about a client to a grand jury.
Rather, the rule applies across the board to all grand jury subpoenas
issued in the Third Circuit, and its purpose is to ensure that the grand
jury subpoenas are issued with regularity and in the course of legitimate
and proper grand jury investigations.28 9
By placing the burden on the prosecution to make such a showing in
all cases, the Schofield rule appears to express a presumption that grand
jury subpoenas are not generally issued with regularity. 290 Whatever the
merits of such a presumption, it does not address the particular concerns
285. See In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir. 1980) ("No privilege, no matter how
central to our system of justice, has been held to excuse the 'obligation of every person to
appear and give his evidence before the grand jury.' ").
286. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
287. 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 94 ("It seems ... that such a minimal requirement is almost indispensable if
citizens are to be afforded minimum protection against the possible arbitrary exercise of power
by a prosecutor through use of the grand jury machinery.") (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
290. Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1013 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
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that arise from requiring attorneys of targets of grand jury investigations
to reveal information about their clients. Therefore, the showing re-
quired by the Schofield rule is not demanding enough in such circum-
stances, for it does not require any showing of necessity and still threatens
the attorney's professional relationship with the target client.291 The
Schofield rule is unnecessarily broad in that it imposes a rule applicable
to all grand jury subpoenas in response to problems arising in connection
with subpoenas to attorneys of grand jury targets.
The Harvey Rule
The Fourth Circuit in the Harvey case292 held that in cases involving
grand jury subpoenas issued to attorneys of targets of grand jury investi-
gations, the prosecution must make a preliminary showing demonstrat-
ing that "the information sought is relevant to and needed for an
investigation being conducted by the grand jury. ' 293 By imposing a need
requirement, the Harvey rule strikes the proper balance between preserv-
ing the ability of the grand jury to investigate effectively and protecting
the attorney-client relationship. The Harvey rule does not impair the
ability of the grand jury to obtain relevant and necessary unprivileged
information from the attorney of a target, but it does ensure that such a
procedure, with its attendant intrusions into the attorney-client relation-
ship, will be followed only when necessary for effective law enforcement.
The Harvey rule thus represents a sensitive accommodation of the inter-
ests that come into conflict when an attorney for a target of a grand jury
investigation is called upon to testify about his client.
The Harvey solution, however, should not be adopted without quali-
fication because the opinion left several questions unanswered. First, it is
not clear from the Harvey opinion whether the requisite preliminary
showing must be made to obtain the subpoena or only to enforce the
subpoena. 294 Second, it does not describe what must be demonstrated in
the preliminary showing. The opinion refers approvingly to the "three-
291. In balancing the public interest in providing the grand jury with the information
it may need against the private interest of maintaining a confidential and important
professional relationship, it is not enough that the subpoena be shown to be regular.
When a grand jury subpoena undermines an ongoing attorney-client relationship, the
United States Attorney should also show by affidavit an important need for the infor-
mation sought.
Id at 101 l(footnote omitted).
292. Id.
293. Id. (emphasis in original).
294. The opinion contains only the following ambiguous language on this point: "Chal-
lenge to the adequacy of the government's preliminary showing may be made at the enforce-
ment hearing or, as in this case, in a motion to quash the subpoena." Id.
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pronged requirement" imposed by Schofield, which required a showing
that the information sought is relevant to an ongoing grand jury investi-
gation, the investigation is properly within the grand jury's jurisdiction,
and the information is not sought primarily for another purpose.295 The
Harvey opinion also emphasizes that an additional showing of need must
be made when an attorney for a target is subpoenaed to give information
about his client to a grand jury. The court declared:
We hold only that the threefold preliminary showing by affidavit (in-
cluding a showing that the information is needed) is required when a
subpoena is issued to an attorney who has been retained by the target
of the grand jury investigation and important sixth amendment and
attorney-client privilege issues are raised.
296
Thus, although it appears that the Fourth Circuit requires the threefold
Schofield showing including a showing of need, the matter is not free
from doubt because such a showing would not be only a threefold prelim-
inary showing, but a fourfold requirement: the "three-pronged require-
ment" of Schofield along with the additional requirement of establishing
need.
Third, the opinion in Harvey does not state what will suffice to show
the requisite need. The court stated in a footnote that it did not consider
it necessary to resolve this issue.297 The court then observed:
The requirements for such a showing will vary according to the cir-
cumstances of each case. We do note, however, that there are two
inquiries the prosecution must address when making a showing of
need. First, is the information sought necessary or important to the
grand jury investigation? Second, is the subpoenaed attorney the best
source for the information? A showing that the information cannot be
obtained from another source would, of course, be important to, but
not necessarily conclusive for, the second inquiry.
298
Courts, therefore, should provide more guidance on what information
prosecutors must present in order to establish a preliminary showing of
need.
Finally, it is uncertain from the Harvey opinion exactly which cir-
cumstances require a preliminary showing. Some language in the opin-
ion suggests that the preliminary showing must be made in all instances
in which such an attorney is subpoenaed by a grand jury. 299 On the
other hand, the court's summary of its holding indicates that the prelimi-
nary showing is necessary "when a subpoena is issued to an attorney who
295. Id. at 1010.
296. Id. at 1011.
297. Id. at 1011 n.6.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1010.
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has been retained by the target of the grand jury investigation and impor-
tant sixth amendment and attorney-client privilege issues are raised.
'' 3°°
This latter statement is ambiguous in itself. It is unclear whether the
court considers "important sixth amendment and attorney-client privi-
lege issues" to be raised whenever a target's attorney is subpoenaed-a
view suggested by the general language in the opinion--or whether the
court believes that the preliminary showing requirement is triggered only
when the subpoenaed attorney or his client actively raise "important
sixth amendment and attorney-client issues." Because the Harvey opin-
ion does not clearly resolve these important questions, practical applica-
tion of the Harvey rule is problematic.
Proposed Solution
As discussed above, because Harvey strikes the correct balance be-
tween the competing interests involved, it can serve as a point of depar-
ture for developing a workable standard for compelling attorneys of
targets to supply grand juries with information about their clients. If the
preliminary showing requirement announced in Harvey is clarified and
refined as suggested below, it should be adopted by the federal courts in
the exercise of their supervisory powers over the conduct of federal grand
jury proceedings.30
1
First, a preliminary showing should be required before the issuance
of a grand jury subpoena to an attorney of a target under grand jury
investigation. Although there might be little substantive difference be-
tween requiring the showing to be made before issuance of the subpoena
rather than after enforcement is sought, it is preferable to require prose-
cutors to make the requisite showing before the process of the court is-
sues against a target's attorney. Such a procedure may make prosecutors
think twice before taking the significant step of subpoenaing a target's
attorney. Further, it will spare the target's attorney from the burden of
challenging a subpoena in order to trigger enforcement proceedings and
the preliminary showing requirement.30 2 The procedure, therefore,
should require a prosecutor to apply to the district court, on notice to the
target and the target's attorney, for the issuance of a grand jury subpoena
to the target's attorney. In connection with that application, the prosecu-
300. Id. at 1011.
301. The circuit courts have supervisory power over the conduct of grand jury proceedings
within their respective circuits. See, eg., id. at 1012; In re Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 704-05 (Ist
Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 964-65 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975).
302. See supra notes 82-87 & accompanying text.
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tor should be required to make the requisite preliminary showing, which,
of course, would be subject to opposition by the target and the target's
attorney.
Second, the preliminary showing should be made by affidavit of an
individual with knowledge about the investigation and the grand jury
proceedings, presumably the prosecutor in charge, and should include
the following:
1) the specific information or documents sought from the attorney
regarding the target, the target's activities or dealings, or the attorney's
representation of the target;
2) an explanation of the relevance to the grand jury's investigation
of the information sought from the target's attorney;
3) an explanation of why the information sought from the target's
attorney is necessary to the grand jury's investigation;
4) a description of the efforts made to secure the information from
other sources including the names of the other sources contacted, the
nature of the contacts made (e.g., interview, subpoena, etc.) and the re-
sults thereof; and
5) the disclosure of information already in the possession of the
grand jury relating to the attorney's client.
Such information should enable the district court to reach an in-
formed conclusion as to whether it is really necessary and useful to sub-
poena the target's attorney, or whether the information sought is
privileged, or otherwise available from other sources. Furthermore, the
information would reveal to the district court whether the prosecutor is
just trying to take a short-cut in his investigation by subpoenaing the
target's attorney, and to what extent the target may be incriminated by
evidence supplied by his attorney. Accordingly, such a showing should
place the district court in a position to determine whether the circum-
stances warrant the intrusion into the target's relationship with his
attorney. 30
3
Finally, it is important to make clear that the preliminary showing
must be made in all instances in which a prosecutor seeks to subpoena an
attorney for a target of a grand jury investigation. Courts should avoid
the uncertainty of Harvey as to whether a claim is raised based on the
sixth amendment or attorney-client privilege.
3 4
303. If such a showing is made, it is not necessary to demand that the requirements of
Schofield also be met, as no subpoena will yet have been issued. The court will be in a position
to determine whether the subpoena is sought in aid of a legitimate grand jury investigation.
304. For a discussion of the uncertainty left by the Harvey decision as to the sixth amend-
ment's application, see Note, supra note 40, at 507-09.
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By adopting such a procedure, courts would eliminate excessive in-
cursions into the attorney-client relationship. Also, many motions to
quash grand jury subpoenas directed at attorneys would be avoided. At-
torneys would still be required to present evidence before grand juries,
but only after a satisfactory prior showing that prosecutors were not
needlessly intruding upon the attorney-client relationship.
30 5
The requirement of a preliminary showing prior to issuance of a
grand jury subpoena to the attorney would alleviate many problems.
First, the attorney would not have to advise the client that he is required
to appear before the grand jury to give testimony and documentary infor-
mation about the client. Rather, the attorney can inform the client that
the prosecutor is seeking permission from a federal judge to call the at-
torney to appear before the grand jury. This difference may seem unim-
portant, yet any prior reassurances about the inviolability of the
attorney-client relationship that the attorney may have given to the client
will be far more credible when a prosecutor is seeking permission to ob-
tain the attorney's testimony rather than immediately compelling him to
testify.
With a preliminary showing requirement, the attorney will also be
able to assure the client that there will be an opportunity to present their
side of the matter to the court when the prosecutor presents his subpoena
application before the court. It would no longer be necessary for the
client and attorney to make a motion of their own to try to escape the
compulsion of an issued subpoena.
More substantively, when the prosecution is unable to make the req-
uisite preliminary showing to justify the issuance of a subpoena, the at-
torney will not be required to make an appearance before the grand jury,
with all the attendant problems. Presumably, the failure to make the req-
uisite showing will occur more frequently than the quashing of subpoe-
nas under the current system, as need and relevance are not necessarily
considered in connection with motions to quash subpoenas. Additionally,
even when the requisite showing is made and a subpoena is issued, the
judge may limit the type of information that the attorney is required to
supply. This practice can prevent potential abuses in the grand jury
room by an overzealous prosecutor, and it can provide a measure of reas-
surance to a concerned client.
A preliminary showing requirement would also be advantageous to
an attorney whose client is uncommunicative or indifferent, as he will not
305. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Doe, 546 F.2d 498, 502 (2d Cir. 19761" In re Grand
Jury Subpoena of Stolar, 397 F. Supp. 520, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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be required to initiate action to ensure judicial consideration of the sub-
poena and the attorney's obligations. Instead of having to initiate the
motion to quash the subpoena, the attorney who is unaided by his client
would be able to appear before the judge hearing the prosecution's sub-
poena application and raise questions as to the need for his appearance
before the grand jury and his obligation to furnish arguably privileged
information.
Of course, the preliminary showing requirement would not mean
that attorneys would never be forced to appear before grand juries or that
attorney-client relationships would never be disrupted by such grand jury
appearances. The requirement would, however, provide a mechanism for
ensuring that intrusions into the attorney-client relationship would not
occur indiscriminately and without the requisite degree of necessity. In
contrast to the present procedure, requiring a foundation before forcing
attorneys to give evidence about their clients strikes a more sensitive bal-
ance between the grand jury's investigatory function and the central posi-
tion of the attorney-client relationship in the judicial system.
Accordingly, federal courts should exercise their supervisory powers
over grand jury procedures to mandate that a proper foundation be es-
tablished before subpoenas can be issued to attorneys of grand jury
targets.
Conclusion
Safeguarding the attorney-client relationship is critical to our judi-
cial process. Allowing a grand jury unbridled access to counsel of a tar-
get under investigation undermines the relationship between attorney
and client, raising serious questions in the client's mind as to whom the
attorney owes primary allegiance: the client or the court. On the other
hand, the grand jury serves a critical role in our criminal justice system
and must be able to fulfill this role by hearing all relevant testimony from
all witnesses called before it. Both the right to aid of effective counsel
and the grand jury's role are protected by the Constitution. Because
these two rights conflict when target's counsel is called before a grand
jury to testify against his client, an accommodation between the two
must be found.
This Article has sought to resolve the conflict that is raised by the
intersection of these competing rights. The proposed solution is born of
the fact that our judicial system has failed to provide adequate safeguards
for the attorney-client relationship in this situation. Such failure is evi-
denced by the ineffectiveness of the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine under these circumstances, and by the conflicting cir-
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cuit court decisions on this issue. The proposed solution strikes an ap-
propriate balance between the two competing interests. While the
proposed requirement of a preliminary showing prior to issuance of a
grand jury subpoena to the target's counsel pursuant to the court's exer-
cise of its supervisory power alleviates many problems, it is sufficiently
narrow to allow the grand jury to pursue its mandate. Thus, this pro-
posed solution should serve as a guideline for consistent rulings by circuit
courts faced with this issue.

